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At the end of the Spanish-American War of 1898, America gained control of three
new territories-PuertoRico, Guam, and the Philippines. The political fate of these
islands generateda bitter debate in the United States as many wondered how a country
whose identity had been forged in the crucible of colonialism could, only a century after
gaining its independence, administeran empire of its own. Despite the enormous political and public attention paid to the issue of American expansion, it was the Supreme
Court-ina series of decisionscollectively known as the Insular Cases-that interceded
to settle the protractedpoliticalfeud. What is most striking about this episode in constitutional history is that the Court's intervention brought closure to a volatile national
debate implicating internationalaffairs and foreign treaties-mattersin which courts
were expected not to meddle-withoutprovoking significantpublic backlash or damaging the Court's institutionalcredibility.And the Insular Cases themselves have remained
good law ever since. This Article seeks to understandwhy.
Specifically, this piece aims to understandthe process by which divisive,politically
charged issues were transformed into questionsfit for judicial review, how that process
ratified the decisions themselves, and what role the political branches can play in validating otherwise questionablejudicialaction. It concludes first that there is considerable
evidence, as a descriptive matter, that before the Supreme Court decided the Insular
Cases, political actors took a series of steps that authorized and facilitatedjudicial considerationof questions that were political in nature.Second, the Article contends, as a
normative matter,that the Insular Cases illustratehow the political branches can properly validate the Court's decisions by consenting in advance to the judiciary's involvement and certifying certain questions to the courts.Although the precisefeatures of this
process defy easy classification, it is possible to discern evidence of five elements that
laid the groundworkfor legitimatejudicial review. By (1) disavowing their own authority to settle the dispute, (2) publicly inviting the Court to mediate the controversy,
(3) endorsing the validity of judicial resolution, (4) casting the political issue in legal
and constitutional terms, and (5) proposing nonlegalfactors that could compensatefor
the absence of traditionalstandards the popular branches helped transform arguably
political questions into justiciable ones. It is this "consent and certify" process that at
once explains and justifies the Supreme Court's intervention in the Insular Cases. More
broadly, the Article suggests that the largely forgotten historical context of the Insular
Cases reveals an important,unexplored potentialsource of judiciallegitimacy:the political branches of government.
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INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States was embroiled in a bitter debate over territorial expansionism. The SpanishAmerican War of 1898 had left America in possession of three new
territories -Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines -whose fate and

future governance were uncertain.' Many wondered how a country
whose identity had been forged in the crucible of colonialism could,
only a century after gaining its independence, administer an empire of
its own.' Political parties fashioned distinctive national platforms to
emphasize pro- and anti-imperialist leanings. Members of Congress
vociferously disagreed about the status of America's newly acquired
territories. And the presidential election of 1900 became a nationwide
referendum on the expansionist policies of the McKinley administration.' Yet, in the end, despite the concentration of political attention
on the subject, these disputes were not resolved by the elected
branches of government. Rather, it was the Supreme Court-in a series of decisions collectively known as the Insular Cases-that inter-

1 Under the Treaty of Paris, Spain also ceded Cuba to the United States. See Treaty of
Peace between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain, 30 Stat 1754, Treaty Ser No 343
(1898) ("Treaty of Paris") ("Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.").
Cuba's postwar status was less in doubt, however, because of the Teller Amendment, an 1898
resolution in which the United States expressly committed in advance to return control of Cuba
to its people. See Joint Resolution for the Recognition of the Independence of the People of
Cuba, Demanding that the Government of Spain Relinquish Its Authority and Government in
the Island of Cuba, and to Withdraw Its Land and Naval Forces from Cuba and Cuban Waters,
and Directing the President of the United States to Use the Land and Naval Forces of the United States to Carry These Resolutions into Effect, J Res 24, 55th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 20, 1898), in
30 Stat 738, 739 (1899) ("Teller Amendment") (stating that the United States "hereby disclaims
any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to
leave the government and control of the Island to its people"). Accordingly, the United States
left Cuba in 1902. See Library of Congress, Teller and Platt Amendments (1998), online at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/teller.html (visited Jan 29, 2010); Bartholomew H. Sparrow,
The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire 135 (Kansas 2006).

2 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 2128 (Feb 23, 1900) (statement of
Sen George G. Vest) ("In the last Congress, when discussing the relations of these newly acquired islands to the United States, I undertook to show that by the historic argument, if I may
so term it, it was impossible that the men who fought the Revolutionary war and made the Constitution of 1789 could ever have contemplated establishing a colonial system in this country.");
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3669 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen William E. Mason)
("[Wihen you levy an impost duty, [such as the one considered here between the United States
and Cuba,] that duty which the fathers were afraid of, that duty which they went to war about,
that duty which invited the Boston tea party-it says when you levy that sort of a duty you must
make it uniform throughout the United States.").
3
See notes 106-10 (describing the political questions answered by the Insular Cases).
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ceded to settle the protracted political feud over the status of American territories and the legitimacy of American expansionism.'
To be sure, the InsularCases are historically notable because they
put to rest a longstanding national controversy, blessed the expansionist agenda of the Republican Party, and established the ground rules
of territorial governance. And there should be renewed interest today
in the Insular Cases because those opinions (originally issued in 1901)
have recently formed part of the legal edifice of the Court's landmark
decision in Boumediene v Bush. As a matter of political theory, however, what is most striking about this episode in constitutional history
is that the Court's intervention in the Insular Cases brought closure to
a volatile national debate without provoking the public's backlash or
damaging the Court's institutional credibility. Indeed, simply by agreeing to consider the cases, the Supreme Court positioned itself to answer profound issues that defined and divided the nation-and the
manner in which the Court ultimately resolved the Insular Cases pronounced a clear winner on the question of American expansionism.
Yet there were no serious charges of judicial activism, or sustained
challenges either to the Court's authority to decide the cases or to the
legitimacy of the decisions themselves. Both sides (warmly or grudgingly) accepted the Court's settlement, and the Insular Cases have
remained good law ever since.
Public and political acquiescence to the decisions is particularly
remarkable because there was little cause at the time to expect it. The
cases unmistakably implicated international affairs and foreign treaties, subjects in which the courts were expected not to meddle; in fact,

4

See Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular

Cases (1901-1922), 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico 225, 303 (1996) ("The intense
debate that had accompanied the process of acquisition of new territories had to be settled in
order for the process to continue its course. There was a need to develop a truly common sense
among the organic intellectuals of the metropolitan state. The decisions of the Insular Cases had
precisely that effect.").
5

See Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 6 (cited in note 1).

128 S Ct 2229,2253-55 (2008). Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion relies directly on the Insular Cases, and hence the validity of the Court's decision concerning the habeas
corpus rights of individuals detained by the United States government may now be inextricably
linked to the legitimacy of the Insular Cases themselves. This project began independent of the
Insular Cases' newfound significance in the context of the modern debate concerning the rights
of noncitizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Base; these recent developments
only underscore the importance of revisiting and better understanding the history, implications,
and enduring validity of the Insular Cases.
7
See text accompanying notes 156-60.
6
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many were aware of the "gravity of the issues at stake"' and at first
questioned the wisdom of the Supreme Court's involvement.! Moreover, the issues presented by the Insular Cases bore a close resemblance to the kinds of political questions that courts, even in 1901,
were forbidden to consider."0 It is true that each of the Insular Cases
had been framed as an issue of statutory interpretation and positive
law; but each also implicated a roiling political debate over American
imperialism." In fact, the main question common to all the cases was
one that traditionally had been decided by the country's political
branches: whether specific territories like Puerto Rico were foreign
or domestic." For these reasons, the Court could easily have declined to
consider the cases, and its failure to do so arguably reinforces the fashionable perception that the Supreme Court of the Lochner era was
comfortable injecting itself into extralegal controversies with significant

8 See Carman E Randolph, Notes on the Law of TerritorialExpansion with Especial Reference to the Philippines7 (De Vinne 1900) (Submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate of the United States, Mar 16,1900).
9 See notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
10 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature political ...

can never be made in this court."). See also Luther v Borden, 48 US 1, 46-47 (1849) ("Much of
the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned upon political rights and political questions,
upon which the court has been urged to express an opinion. We decline doing so.").
11 See notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
12 Of the nine Insular Cases, seven of them concerned the status of Puerto Rico. See De
Lima v Bidwell, 182 US 1, 1-2 (1901) (holding that after its cession to the United States by the
treaty with Spain, Puerto Rico was no longer a "foreign country," within the meaning of the
Dingley Tariff Act); Goetze v United States, 182 US 221, 221 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico and
the Hawaiian Islands were not foreign countries within the meaning of the tariff laws); Dooley v
United States, 182 US 222, 222 (1901) ("Dooley I") (holding that Puerto Rico and the United
States were foreign countries with respect to each other, within the meaning of the revenue laws,
while the island was in the military occupation of the United States, before its cession to the
United States by treaty); Armstrong v United States, 182 US 243, 244 (1901) (holding that Puerto
Rico and the United States were foreign countries with respect to each other, within the meaning
of the revenue laws, while Puerto Rico was under military occupation by the United States);
Downes v Bidwell, 182 US 244,247 (1901) (holding that the imposition of duties on imports from
Puerto Rico under the Foraker Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power); Huus v
New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co, 182 US 392, 392 (1901); Dooley v United States, 183 US

151, 153 (1901) ("Dooley II") (holding that taxes imposed on imports into Puerto Rico were
constitutional because Puerto Rico was not considered a state). In addition, one dealt exclusively
with Hawaii, see Crossman v United States, 182 US 221, 221 (1901) (consolidated with Goetze)
(holding that imports from Hawaii were not subject to tariffs imposed on imports from a foreign
country because Hawaii was not considered a foreign country), and one addressed the Philippines, see Fourteen Diamond Rings v United States, 183 US 176, 177 (1901) (holding that di-

amonds imported from the Philippines were not subject to tariffs imposed on imports from a
foreign country because the Philippines was not considered a foreign country). For a more detailed description of these cases, see Part I.A.
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policy and political dimensions." Despite all this, the Court's decision to
interject-and the legitimacy of the Insular Cases themselves-has

stood the test of time. This Article seeks to understand why.
Accordingly, the Article explores the history of the Insular Cases
in order to explain how the Court found itself in a legitimate position
to settle questions ordinarily reserved for political and public resolution. Specifically, it attempts to understand the process by which divisive and politically charged issues were transformed into questions
apparently fit for judicial review, and how that process validated the
decisions themselves. This overarching inquiry produces two conclusions. First,as a descriptive matter, there is considerable evidence that,
before the Supreme Court decided the Insular Cases, political actors
took a series of steps that authorized and facilitated judicial consideration of questions that were mainly political in nature. Among other
things, for example, elected officials publicly called upon the Supreme
Court to enter its view, describing the political controversy in emphatically legal terms. Second, as a normative matter, I contend that the Insular Cases provide an illustration of where the political branches defensibly validated the Court's decisions by consenting in advance to the judiciary's involvement and essentially certifying certain questions to the
courts. It is this "consent and certify" process, in my view, that explains
and justifies the Supreme Court's intervention in the Insular Cases.
More broadly, I conclude that this episode in constitutional history reveals a valid, but largely unappreciated and unexplored, source of judicial legitimacy: the political branches of government.
To establish and defend this process whereby political actors enhance the legitimacy of judicial actions, this Article proceeds in five
parts. Part I provides relevant background. First, it summarizes the
Insular Cases themselves, underscoring that although the specific legal
question varied from case to case, all of the Insular Cases addressed
the status of territories acquired by conquest and treaty. Second, it
reviews the literature commenting on these cases, reporting that most
prior scholarship either refers to the cases as evidence of the political
controversies of the time, or dissects the reasoning of the opinions in
order to understand how they influenced America's subsequent governance of the territories at issue. Part I also surveys research on the
sources of judicial legitimacy, noting that most scholarship connects
the validity of judicial decisionmaking to the logic of the opinions
13 See, for example, Paul Finkelman, Book Review, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In
Defense of Brown, 118 Harv L Rev 973,1009 (2005) (describing criticisms of Lochner and judicial activism by the Supreme Court between 1880 and 1930).
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themselves, to the strength of the underlying interpretive methods, or
to the legitimacy of the overarching political structure. Few have considered (even generally) the role of the popular branches of government in validating the judiciary's actions-and it seems no one has
studied how the Supreme Court was able to navigate and put to rest a
raging political debate about American expansionism without calling
into question the legitimacy of the judiciary and the validity of its decisions." By deeply probing one significant historical illustration where
the political branches appear to have directly reinforced the legitimacy of judicial action, this Article seeks to address these apparent gaps
in the literature and, in doing so, to begin to highlight the political
roots of judicial legitimacy.
To do so, Part II begins by establishing the basic predicate of this
Article: the Insular Cases, somewhat surprisingly, produced very little
public backlash as both sides accepted the Court's opinions as a valid
resolution of the dispute. Part II enumerates why this was unexpected,
describing how (1) an impassioned public was deeply divided over the
issue of expansionism and closely monitored the Court's involvement,
(2) many recalled the Court's fateful decision in Dred Scott and
warned that the Insular Cases might lead to similar consequences, and
(3) the Insular Cases presented controversial questions with significant political dimensions that under ordinary circumstances may have
been unfit for judicial review. To validate this third observation, the
Article provides a brief overview of the political question doctrine
itself (as it stood at the turn of the twentieth century). Even measured
against these early doctrinal standards, the putatively legal issues presented by the Insular Cases perhaps qualified as political questions
that the Supreme Court should (or at the very least could) have declined to review. This characterization of the issues raised by the Insular Cases is corroborated by several justices' individual statements, by
the highly political considerations that dominated their opinions, and
by the historical context surrounding the cases.
Next, Part III sifts through the congressional record in order to document the process by which elected officials and other political actors
facilitated and legitimized the Court's involvement in the Insular Cases.
The precise features of this process defy easy classification; it is possible
however to discern evidence of five elements that laid the groundwork
for legitimate judicial review. By (1) disavowing the authority of the legislature and executive to resolve the matter, (2) publicly inviting the Court
14

See notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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to mediate the controversy, (3) endorsing the validity of judicial involvement, (4) casting the political issue in legal and constitutional terms, and
(5) proposing nonlegal factors that could compensate for the absence of
traditional legal standards, the popular branches helped transform arguably political questions into justiciable ones.
Part IV then sets forth a preliminary normative case for this
"consent and certify" process, explaining why it represents a defensible means by which political actors can fortify the legitimacy of judicial actions. Courts must, of course, be sufficiently insulated from political currents in order to act independently. That does not mean,
however, that the legitimacy of judicial pronouncements is not rightly
influenced by the prior activities and statements of the popular
branches of government. Part IV outlines three sets of considerations
to support this position. First, where the political branches have affirmatively solicited and consented to judicial involvement, the principal
concerns that underlie modern political question doctrine -a doctrine
that may draw into question a decision's legitimacy -are substantially
diminished. When a case presents a putative political question, the
appropriateness of assertive judicial action is enhanced by the political
branches' recommendation to intervene, creating the kind of interdependent, "workable government" envisioned by Justice Robert Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer." Second, political ac-

tors can validly help discern the elusive line between the kind of question reserved exclusively for political resolution and the kind that is
appropriate for judicial review-and their views in this regard can
inform and validate the judiciary's decision to consider questions that
fall near that line. Finally, just as federal courts can certify questions to
their state counterparts, the political branches may also ask the courts,
in certain circumstances, to share their views on matters that are partly legal and partly political in nature. This dynamic dialogue between
the courts and representatives of the people validates and strengthens
the actions of each. And encouraging this kind of intergovernmental
discourse resists the fiction that the legitimacy of a court's decision is
(or should be) a static, academic judgment, acknowledging instead
that the people and their representatives must ultimately approve a
judicial decision if it is to endure and lay the foundation, as the Insular
Cases have, for further pronouncements a hundred years hence.

1s See 343 US 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power
... it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
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I. BACKGROUND

In 1898, Ambassador John Milton Hay transmitted a letter to thenLieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, describing the United States'
conflict with Spain as a "splendid little war." 6 It lasted a mere four
months, yet at its conclusion Spain transferred to the United States possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and governing authority
over an independent Cuba." Cuba was treated differently from the
three other territories because, immediately before formal military conflict commenced, the United States Congress passed the Teller
Amendment to express America's commitment to liberating the people
of Cuba. Among other things, the amendment prospectively bound the
United States to free Cuba from all colonial rule once the conflict abated. Accordingly, the Treaty of Paris-which formally ended the
war-established limited ties between America and Cuba by explicitly
providing that the sovereign people of Cuba would rule themselves.
The treaty failed to specify, however, the exact relationship between the United States and the remaining island territories. After the
political branches wrestled inconclusively with this issue for nearly
three years-a period discussed extensively in Part II-the question
was redirected to the Supreme Court in the form of the Insular Cases.
Part I.A describes the individual cases, and Part I.B summarizes the
existing scholarship commenting on these cases.
The InsularCases

A.

The Supreme Court heard the nine Insular Cases over the course
of two terms: seven were decided on May 27, 1901,n and two were postponed until the following term and decided on December 2,1901.
16 Peter Huchthausen, America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military
Engagements:1975-2000 xv (Penguin 2003).
17 The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, 1898 and ratified on April 11, 1899.
Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat at 1754.
18 See Teller and Platt Amendments (cited in note 1) (declaring that the United States
"hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people").

19 Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and

Unequal 17-18 (Puerto Rico 1985); Carl Schurz, American Imperialism, in Theodore P Greene,
ed, American Imperialism in 1898 77,83 (D.C. Heath 1955).
2

The seven cases settled on May 27, 1901 were De Lima v Bidwell, 182 US 1, 1 (1901);

Goetze v United States, 182 US 221, 221 (1901); Crossman v United States, 182 US 221, 221 (1901);
Dooley v United States, 182 US 222, 222 (1901) ("Dooley F); Armstrong v United States, 182 US
243, 243 (1901); Downes v Bidwell, 182 US 244, 246 (1901); Huus v New York & Porto Rico

Steamship Co, 182 US 392,392 (1901).
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Many consider Downes v Bidwell the lead decision among the
Insular Cases.2 According to Justice John Marshall Harlan, it "involve[d] consequences of the most momentous character."4 The controversy arose when Samuel Downes, a merchant whose company had
imported oranges from Puerto Rico, brought suit against the collector
of the port of New York in order to recover back duties he had paid
on his "imports." Downes claimed that the Treaty of Paris, which declared Puerto Rico a United States territory and severed its ties with
Spain, meant that Puerto Rico was no longer "foreign" to the United
States. He further observed that the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution provided that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."n Accordingly, Downes argued that the

federal law permitting the New York duty (which taxed trade with
Puerto Rico) violated the Uniformity Clause, insisting that the phrase
"throughout the United States" included American territories. The
premise of this argument was that a newly acquired territory such as
Puerto Rico could not indefinitely be kept separate from the rest of
the United States:
[I]t is said that the spirit of the Constitution excludes the conception of property or dependencies possessed by the United States
and which are not so completely incorporated as to be in all respects a part of the United States; that the theory upon which the
Constitution proceeds is that of confederated and independent
states, and that no territory, therefore, can be acquired which
does not contemplate statehood, and excludes the acquisition of
any territory which is not in a position to be treated as an integral
part of the United States.
Advocates of American imperialism objected to Downes's position
since it called into question the power of Congress to establish territo21

The two cases settled on December 2, 1901 were Dooley v United States, 183 US 151, 151

(1901) ("Dooley II"), and FourteenDiamond Rings v United States, 183 US 176,176 (1901). See

Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 122 (cited in note 1) ("Justice Brown had requested
that Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States (the 'Philippine case') and Dooley v. United States

II be postponed until the next term, and Chief Justice Fuller agreed to do so.").
22
182 US 244 (1901).
23 See, for example, Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic
Sense. Puerto Rico,American Expansion, and the Constitution 7 (Duke 2001) (emphasizing the significance of Downes partly because "it produced the most detailed exposition of Justice White's doctrine of
incorporation"); Sparrow, EmergenceofAmerican Empireat 11 (cited in note 1).
24
See Downes, 182 US at 379 (Harlan dissenting).
25
US Const Art I, § 8 (emphasis added). See Downes, 182 US at 249.
26
Downes, 182 US at 311-12 (White concurring).
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ries that remained forever outside the United States; moreover, it specifically challenged Congress's authority to create laws with respect to
US territories that would have been unconstitutional had they been
directed at states fully within the union.
By a 5-4 vote, a fractured Supreme Court rejected Downes's view
in a decision that produced five separate writings and no clear majority opinion. On its surface, Downes held only that the heavier duties
imposed upon Puerto Rican imports were valid, leaving US territories
outside the Constitution's Uniformity Clause. But the basis of the ruling was crucial, for the Court reconceived of Puerto Rico not as foreign or domestic, but rather as "a territory appurtenant and belonging
to the United States, but not a part of the United States."" Or as Justice Edward White famously put it, Puerto Rico was "foreign to the
United States in a domestic sense."29 In effect, the Court endorsed
Congress's authority to govern Puerto Rico as a satellite colony, formally validating the territory's hybrid status somewhere between foreign nation and domestic state.
Justice Henry Brown, who cast the decisive vote,' offered a wide
range of reasons to justify the Court's view that Congress could lawfully leave Puerto Rico in this unusual intermediate position. First, he
referred to settled foreign and domestic practices. He claimed that,
absent a contrary constitutional directive, the United States should
have the same power over newly acquired territories that other nations historically possessed." He also observed that Congress had consistently treated states and territories differently under the Constitution, though he admitted that prior territories had been squarely placed
27
Id at 286 (majority) ("A false step at this time might be fatal to the development of what
Chief Justice Marshall called the American empire.").
28 Id at 287.
29 Id at 341 (White concurring). Justice White was joined by Justices George Shiras and
Joseph McKenna. Id at 287. Years later, in Balzac v Porto Rico, 258 US 298,305 (1922), the Court
unanimously affirmed this view.
30 Justice Brown was the decisive vote in both Downes and De Lima, joining the four
dissenting justices in Downes to form a majority in De Lima. He was in the majority in all nine
cases and wrote the opinion for the Court in eight. See Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire
at 112 (cited in note 1) (explaining that Chief Justice Fuller assigned to Justice Brown eight of
the opinions because of his expertise in admiralty law).
31 Downes, 182 US at 285:
If it be once conceded that we are at liberty to acquire foreign territory, a presumption arises that our power with respect to such territories is the same power which other nations
have been accustomed to exercise with respect to territories acquired by them. If in limiting
the power which Congress was to exercise within the United States, it was also intended to
limit it with regard to such territories as the people of the United States should thereafter
acquire, such limitations should have been expressed.
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on the path to statehood at the outset." Second, Justice Brown argued
that the text of the Constitution suggested the possibility of territories
that were neither fully foreign nor fully domestic. For example, he reasoned that, by "prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude 'within the
United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction". the Thir-

teenth Amendment implied "that there may be places within the jurisdiction of the United States that are no part of the Union."4
Justice Brown also stressed the consequence of the Court's ruling
on the future prospects of an American empire. He believed that natural events or a successful war could "bring about conditions which
would render the annexation of distant possessions desirable."" He
voiced reluctance to interfere with America's advancement in those
circumstances: "A false step at this time might be fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called the American empire.""
And contracting the scope of Congress's authority over Puerto Rico
was tantamount to limiting America's power to acquire territories:
We are also of opinion that the power to acquire territory by
treaty implies, not only the power to govern such territory, but to
prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in what Chief Justice
Marshall termed the "American empire.". . . Indeed, it is doubtful

if Congress would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon
the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to
our habits, traditions, and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States.
For these reasons (among othersa), the Court ruled against Downes
and concluded that Puerto Rico was not fully part of the United
States, but rather was "foreign ... in a domestic sense."
32
Id at 258 ("Congress has or has not applied the revenue laws to the territories, as the
circumstances of each case seemed to require .... Congress has been consistent in recognizing
the difference between the states and territories under the Constitution.").
33 Id at 251 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
34
Id.
35 Downes, 182 US at 286-87.
36 Id at 286.
37
Id at 279-80.
38 Justice Brown also distinguished adverse prior rulings For example, in order to diminish
Dred Scott, 60 US at 450-51, which stated that Congress could not legislate with respect to a territory in a manner that exceeded what Congress could validly do with respect to a state, he contended
that the germane part of Dred Scott was dicta and that slavery and tariff regulations were distinguishable in any event. See Downes, 182 US at 273-74 ("The power to prohibit slavery in the territories is so different from the power to impose duties upon territorial products.").
39 Downes, 182 US at 341 (White concurring).
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Four justices dissented, two of them publishing opinions-Chief
Justice Melville Fuller and Justice John Marshall Harlan-arguing
that the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution applied to all territories subject to American authority. Chief Justice Fuller's dissent expressly rejected the broad authority claimed by the government to
administer Puerto Rico without constitutional limit:
[T~he contention seems to be that, if an organized and settled
province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States,
Congress has the power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in
an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite
period; and, more than that, that after it has been called from that
limbo, commerce with it is absolutely subject to the will of Congress, irrespective of constitutional provisions.
That theory assumes that the Constitution created a government
empowered to acquire countries throughout the world, to be governed by different rules than those obtaining in the original
states and territories, and substitutes for the present system of
republican government a system of domination over distant
provinces in the exercise of unrestricted power. In our judgment,
so much of the Porto Rican act as authorized the imposition of
these duties is invalid.
He added that "[t]he people of all the states are entitled to a voice in the
settlement of [this] subject," and hence that a constitutional amendment
was needed to authorize the colonial structure envisioned by the majority. Justice Harlan, for his part, echoed the chief justice's arguments.4 He

Id at 372-74 (Fuller dissenting).
Id at 374.
42 He wrote: "I reject altogether the theory that Congress, in its discretion, can exclude the
Constitution from a domestic territory of the United States, acquired, and which could only have
been acquired, in virtue of the Constitution." Id at 386 (Harlan dissenting). Justice Harlan also
highlighted the tension between the Downes decision and the Court's ruling in De Lima, which
concluded that Puerto Rico was not foreign (and hence that a tariff could not be imposed upon it):
I cannot agree that [Puerto Rico] is a domestic territory of the United States for the purpose of preventing the application of the tariff act imposing duties upon imports from foreign countries, but not a part of the United States for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional requirement that all duties, imposts, and excises imposed by Congress "shall be uniform throughout the United States." How [Puerto] Rico can be a domestic territory of the
United States, as distinctly held in De Lima v. Bidwell, and yet, as is now held, not embraced
by the words "throughout the United States," is more than I can understand.
Id.
40

41
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too insisted that an amendment was required to authorize the grant of
power demanded by those in favor of an American empire:
We heard much in argument about the "expanding future of our
country." It was said that the United States is to become what is
called a "world power;" and that if this government intends to
keep abreast of the times and be equal to the great destiny that
awaits the American people, it must be allowed to exert all the
power that other nations are accustomed to exercise. My answer is,
that the fathers never intended that the authority and influence of
this nation should be exerted otherwise than in accordance with
the Constitution. If our government needs more power than is
conferred upon it by the Constitution, that instrument provides
the mode in which it may be amended and additional power thereby obtained. The People of the United States who ordained the
Constitution never supposed that a change could be made in our
system of government by mere judicial interpretation."
The other Insular Cases rulings were somewhat derivative of
Downes, and because they implicated many of the same considerations, they were equally contentious. For example, De Lima v Bidwell"
presented the opposite problem of Downes: Downes held that Puerto
Rico was not domestic; De Lima addressed whether Puerto Rico was
foreign. The controversy arose in a similar fashion. De Lima & Company filed suit to recover duties paid on sugar imports from Puerto
Rico. According to the plaintiff, Puerto Rico was not a foreign country
under the US Tariff Act of 1897." Despite its ruling in Downes that
Puerto Rico was not a domestic part of the United States, the Court
ultimately concluded that Puerto Rico was not foreign either." Obliquely acknowledging the tension between Downes and De Lima, the
Court remarked that the rulings should not be read to negatively affect
one another." Writing again for a slim 5-4 majority, Justice Brown narrowly defined a foreign country as "one exclusively within the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and without the sovereignty of the United

43
44

Downes, 182 US at 386-87 (Harlan dissenting).
182 US 1 (1901).

45

Id at 180-81.

46

Id at 200.

47 In fact, in

Fourteen Diamond Rings, the Court rejected the argument that one justice's
concurrence in both De Lima and Downes undercut the precedential value of De Lima. Fourteen
Diamond Rings, 183 US at 181-82. The Court summarily dismissed the suggestion: "The ruling in
the Case of De Lima remained unaffected, and controls that under consideration." Id at 182.
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States." Accordingly, because the treaty with Spain transferred the territory of Puerto Rico to the United States, it was no longer a foreign
country: "We are therefore of [the] opinion that at the time these duties
were levied Porto Rico was not a foreign country within the meaning of
the tariff laws, but a territory of the United States, that the duties were
illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover them
back." 9 The consolidated cases of Goetze v United States and Crossman

v United States' simply affirmed the basic principle of De Lima, reiterating that Puerto Rico and Hawaii were not foreign countries under
American tariff law and reversing on that basis the administrative decision to tax merchandise imported into the United States."
The prior cases were all predicated upon goods shipped from one
of the territories into the United States. Some of the Insular Cases also
addressed the converse question of how to treat merchandise sent
from the United States into the territories. In Dooley v United States,2
for example, the Court held that before the ratification of the Treaty
of Paris, duties that had been levied on exports to Puerto Rico were
lawfully collected by the military commander and the President under
the war power." After ratification of the treaty, however, Puerto Rico
"ceased to be a foreign country,"" and hence export levies were
invalid. Addressing the related problem of import duties, Armstrong v
United States" concerned taxes imposed upon imports received into
San Juan; the Court upheld "duties exacted by the collector of the port
of San Juan" on goods imported from the United States because the
territories were not states subject to the Uniformity Clause.Adding some confusion was Huus v New York & Porto Rico

Steamship Co," which only reinforced the impression that the status of
these territories remained somewhere between foreign sovereign and

De Lima, 182 US at 180.
Id at 200.
5o 182 US 221 (1901).
51 Id at 221-22.
52 182 US 222 (1901) ("Dooley ").
53 Id at 230 ("[Glovernment must be carried on, and there was no one left to administer its
functions but the military forces of the United States. Money is requisite for that purpose, and
money could only be raised by order of the military commander. The most natural method was
by the continuation of existing duties.").
54 Id at 234.
55
182 US 243 (1901).
56
Id at 244.
57 182 US 392 (1901).
48

49
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domestic state.u In Huus, the Supreme Court addressed: (1) whether
Puerto Rican ports were foreign, (2) whether trade between Puerto
Rico and the United States was "coasting" or domestic trade, and
(3) whether ships traveling between Puerto Rico and the United
States were domestic, "coastwise steam vessels."" In this narrow context, a unanimous Court held that the Foraker Act (the federal law
that established civilian government in Puerto Rico) nationalized
Puerto Rico and entitled its ports to be considered within the United
States for shipping purposes alone.w In contrast to the other Insular
Cases, the Court rested its conclusion on § 9 of the Foraker Act, which
provided for the "nationalization of all vessels" and guaranteed that
"the coasting trade between Porto Rico and the United States shall be
regulated in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to such
trade between any two great coasting districts of the United States."
Accordingly, the Court held that the vessel was "engaged in the coasting trade, and that the New York pilotage laws did not apply to her."62
By December 1901, the Court had set forth its affirmative view of
the status of United States-controlled territories. They were "foreign
to the United States in a domestic sense." The clumsy phrasing is not
easy to decipher. But understood in the context of the first seven Insular Cases, it meant that these territories were no longer foreign entities -and hence import and export levies applicable to foreign nations
could not be collected. But nor were they domestic, and thus levies did
not have to be uniformly applied to them as though they were newly
added states. Much like the traditional spoils of conquest during the
colonial era, these territories-to the chagrin of anti-imperialistswere stranded somewhere in between.
The two final installments decided the following term did little to
dislodge this overall result. In Dooley v United States," the Court took
up the issue of the constitutionality of the Foraker Act itself.5 The Act
fixed duties on imports into Puerto Rico, and was challenged as a vi58 Id at 396 (finding that Puerto Rico "never belonged to the United States, or any of the
states composing the Union" but that trade with Puerto Rico "is properly a part of the domestic
trade of the" United States).
59 The Court answered the latter two questions in the affirmative without reaching the first
question. Id at 397.
6
Id at 396-97. See Foraker Act, 31 Stat 77 (1900), codified as amended at 48 USC §731 et seq.
61
See Foraker Act, 31 Stat at 79.
62 Huus, 182 US at 397.
6
Downes, 182 US at 341 (White concurring).
6
183 US 151 (1901) ("Dooley II").
65
Id at 152-53.
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olation of Article I, § 9 of the Constitution, which states that "no tax
or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."" The case
again hinged on whether Puerto Rico was a domestic state, foreign
sovereign, or something in between. Finding that Puerto Rico was not
a state but rather a territory held by the United States, the Court
upheld the Act's constitutionality.67
Finally, Fourteen Diamond Rings v United States" simply extended
to the Philippines principles that had been established with respect to
69
Puerto Rico (and, in one instance, Hawaii). Specifically, the Court considered whether rings brought to California from Luzon, Philippines
after the ratification of the peace treaty were illegally imported because
they had been shipped from a foreign country without the necessary
payment of duties. The Court resolved the dispute on the ground that
the Philippines, like Puerto Rico, was not a foreign territory: "The Philippines were not simply occupied, but acquired, and having been
granted and delivered to the United States, by their former master,
were no longer under the sovereignty of any foreign nation.""
Through these nine decisions, the Supreme Court seemingly settled a long-running national debate about the status of territories acquired in the wake of a war." The Court's rulings authorized the
McKinley administration to retain territories without incorporating
them into the United States -in effect, sanctioning the colonization of
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines.2 Before documenting the
deeply political nature of the questions resolved by the Court
(Part II), and before trying to explain why the Court may have validly
Id at 153 (emphasis added).
Id at 157 (reasoning that Congress had greater power to legislate the affairs of a territory than a state).
68 183 US 176 (1901).
69 Id at 179.
70 Id at 178.
71 See, for example, Porto Rico Is Subject to Congress,Philadelphia Inquirer B8 (May 28,
1901) ("The decision concerning Porto Rico cuts the ground from under the feet of those persons who have opposed the annexation of Cuba on the ground that free sugar and free tobacco
would ruin the home industries."); Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico at 61 (cited in
note 19) ("Thus, amazingly, in one day, the Court held Puerto Rico to be in and/or out of the
66
67

United States in three different ways!"); Alan Tauber, The Empire Forgotten: The Application of
the Bill of Rights to US. Territories,57 Case W Res L Rev 147,148 (2006).
72
See Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 261 (cited in note 4) ("Territories can be either incorporated or unincorporated; organized or unorganized. The determination of their status depends on the will of Congress."); Editorial, Philadelphia Record 4 (May 29,
1901) ("The Supreme Court of the United States has sustained President McKinley and reversed
Chief Justice Marshall. It has reasserted the right of taxation without representation that the
colonies fought to overturn."); Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 103 (cited in note 1).
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considered these questions (Part III), it is useful to consider briefly
what prior commentators have said about these cases.
B.

Review of the Literature

Despite their historical significance, the Insular Cases have received sparse scholarly attention in the hundred years since they were
decided. Chief Justice William Rehnquist once observed with respect
to the Insular Cases that "[e]ven the most astute law student of today
would probably be completely unfamiliar with these cases; indeed,
[even] when I went to law school more than 30 years ago, they rated
only a footnote in a constitutional law case book."', Judge Jos6 Cabranes subsequently remarked, "Justice Rehnquist's observation was
equally true when I went to law school more than 20 years ago-only
then I (who searched diligently) had difficulty finding that footnote.""
Thankfully, the cases have received greater attention over the last
decade." But the scope of current scholarship still remains relatively limited and clusters around two main subjects. One line of scholarship
refers to the Insular Cases in the context of chronicling the political controversies and public climate during the Spanish-American War and in its
aftermath." Walter LaFeber, for example, explains American expansionism at the end of the Spanish-American War as largely driven by a search
73
See Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and
the Saga ofAmerican Expansionism, 17 Const Comment 241,246 (2000) (describing the Insular Cases

as a "topic that is remarkably understudied by constitutional scholars, much to our detriment").
74 Josd A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico and the Constitution, 110 FRD 475,477 (1986) (addressing
the 1985 Judicial Conference of the First Circuit), citing William H. Rehnquist, Edward Douglass
White Lecture, Louisiana State University (Mar 19,1983).
75 Cabranes, 110 FRD at 477 (cited in note 74). See also Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United
States, Puerto Rico, and the TerritorialIncorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of ConstitutionalAuthoritarianism,31 John Marshall L Rev 55,57 n 13 (1997).
76
See, for example, Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 111-41 (cited in note 1);

Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense at 82-166 (cited in note 23); Juan R.
Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of PoliticalApartheid,29 U Pa J Intl

L 283,286 (2007); Tauber, 57 Case W Res L Rev at 154-73 (cited in note 71); Burnett, 72 U Chi L
Rev at 805-13 (cited in note 17).
77
For books and articles on the political debates about expansionism, legislation passed by
Congress and the President regarding the newly acquired territories, and the 1900 election
waged at the height of the debate about American imperialism, see Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr, The
Law of United States Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions25-27 (Lawyers Cooperative 1995);
John M. Blum, et al, The National Experience:A History of the United States 534-37 (Harcourt,
Brace 5th ed 1981); Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United
States Territorial Relations 19 (Martinus Nijhoff 1989); Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in US
Imperialism:The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946 35-36
(South Carolina 1972). See generally Thomas A. Bailey, Was the PresidentialElection of 1900 a

Mandate on Imperialism?, 24 Miss Valley Hist Rev 43,45-52 (1937).
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for new markets in Asia and Latin America.7 Robert Beisner studied the
grassroots movement of anti-imperialism and the twelve public figures,
including former President Benjamin Harrison, who spearheaded the
movement." This body of scholarship refers obliquely to the Insular Cases only to situate the decisions in a broader narrative about the dominant
political and economic trends at the turn of the century.
Another body of literature concentrates on the reasoning of the
Insular Cases and on how these rulings shaped America's subsequent
governance of the newly acquired territories." Some have scrutinized
the Court's opinions, their internal consistency, and the distinctions
the Court drew between "incorporated" territories, which the Court
expected to eventually join the Union as states, and "unincorporated"
territories, which could be retained indefinitely and where only the
most basic provisions of the Constitution applied." Others, elaborating
upon concerns that were prominent at the time the decisions were
issued, have explored the role of the Insular Cases in laying the
groundwork for an American empire.u For example, Christina Burnett
has argued that the Insular Cases facilitated imperialism by allowing
America to acquire territory only to then formally and permanently
78

Walter LaFeber, The New Empire:An Interpretation ofAmerican Expansion, 1860-1898

370-79 (Cornell 1963).
79

Robert L. Beisner, Twelve against Empire:The Anti-Imperialists,1898-1900 xxv (Chicago

1985).
See, for example, Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 169-211 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Owen M. Fiss, 8 History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 241 (Macmillan 1993); Jon M. Van Dyke,
The Evolving Legal Relationships between the United States and Its Affiliated US.-Flag Islands,
80

81

14 U Hawaii L Rev 445, 449-50 (1992); Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of
TerritorialIncorporation,26 Colum L Rev 823, 840 (1926); David K. Watson, Acquisition and
Government of National Domain,41 Am L Rev 239,253-54 (1907).
82
See, for example, Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 215-28 (cited in note 1);

Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense at 2 (cited in note 23) ("The Insular
Cases ... enable[d] the United States to acquire and govern its new'possessions' without promising them either statehood or independence."); Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 57 (cited in
note 75) (arguing that the Insular Cases "vested with constitutional legitimacy the existence of a
second class of citizens not entitled to all the protections afforded other citizens on the mainland"); Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto Rico at 300-03 (cited in note 4) (arguing
that the decisions "produced an authoritative rationale for the claim that Congress could exercise almost unrestricted power over the peoples of the territories"); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Puerto
Rico: Colonialismas ConstitutionalDoctrine, 100 Harv L Rev 450,458-59 (1986) ("The doctrine

of territorial incorporation seemed ... an ideal solution to the question of how the United States
might deal with the people of the new colonies."); Torruella, The Supreme Courtand Puerto Rico
at 118-33 (cited in note 19) (noting that the Insular Cases "created an unprecedented status
under United States sovereignty: an American territory for whom no pledge of even future
equality was made"); James E. Kerr, The Insular Cases: The Role of the Judiciary in American

Expansionism92-111 (Kennikat 1982).
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distance itself from those territories: "[Tihe doctrine of territorial incorporation thus amounted to a constitutional doctrine of territorial
deannexation.".
There is a final body of scholarship that does not deal directly
with the Insular Cases but is nonetheless relevant to this Article. It
concerns the sources and significance of judicial legitimacy, and this
line of literature is far better developed. There are a number of authors who have emphasized the importance of legitimacy to the longevity of specific Supreme Court rulings and to the work of the Court
itself.w Scholars have also long debated from what sources judicial
legitimacy is derived. Some, like Ronald Dworkin and Ken Kress, link
the authority of a decision to the coherence of its philosophical underpinnings.5 Others, including Owen Fiss and Joseph Raz, contend
that the strength of any given judicial decision depends ultimately on
whether the polity accepts the overarching legal structures and norms
that are in place, for example, "the value of judicial interpretation,"
the "worth of the Constitution," and "the place of constitutional values in the American system."86 Still others, such as James Boland, believe that the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions corresponds
mainly to the stature of specific justices and to the strength of the interpretive modes of analysis they apply."
By contrast, scant attention has been paid to the idea that judicial
legitimacy may be derived from the political branches themselves.
Burnett, 72 U Chi L Rev at 802 (cited in note 17).
See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, The Day after Roe, Atlantic Monthly 56 (June 2006):
[Slerious people on both sides of the abortion divide are girding themselves for the fights in
Congress and the state legislatures that they believe will erupt once Roe is finally
uprooted.... [I]n many of the fifty states, and ultimately in Congress, the overturning of
Roe will probably ignite one of the most explosive political battles since the civil-rights
movement, if not the Civil War.
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the importance of the legitimacy of its rulings; in
Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 845-46 (1992), it invoked "principles of institutional
integrity" as a reason for holding that it could not overturn the decision in Roe v Wade, 410 US
113 (1973).
85
See, for example, Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal L Rev 283, 290-95 (1989) (reviewing various versions of philosophical legitimacy); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 190-216
(Belknap 1986) (discussing the Supreme Court's legitimacy as rooted in the philosophical underpinnings of the decisions).
86 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 Stan L Rev 739,756 (1982) (arguing that
the authoritativeness of judicial rulings "vitally depends on a recognition of the value of judicial
interpretation"); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 1-27 (Clarendon 1979) (emphasizing those
same values).
83
8

8
James M. Boland, ConstitutionalLegitimacy and the Culture Wars: Rule of Law or Dictatorship of a Shifting Supreme Court Majority?, 36 Cumb L Rev 245,246-47 (2006) (noting that the legiti-

macy of rulings is rooted in the justices and the interpretive modes of analysis they applied).
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Thus, little has been done to explore how the actions of the political
branches can validate and lend credibility to the decisions of the
courts, particularly on matters that have deeply engaged politicians
and the public. There is one recent and noteworthy exception to this.
In his book, Political Foundationsof Judicial Supremacy, Keith Whit-

tington explains that the principle that the courts are the final arbiters
of the meaning of the Constitution is the result, at least partly, of the
systematic and sustained efforts of political actors throughout history
to cast the courts in that role.8 Whittington's critical insight is an important launching point for this project, for it recognizes that the legitimacy of the Court's basic role with respect to the Constitution has
itself been influenced throughout history by the popular branches of
government. Yet Whittington does not purport to examine how this is
accomplished in the context of specific decisions, what actions reinforce or erode the legitimacy of a particular judicial opinion, or
whether the enduring vitality of a court's pronouncements properly
rests on what elected officials say and do in advance of and after a
decision is reached. In other words, once one accepts that it is the
Court's role to interpret the Constitution (or a particular law), what
determines whether a controversial pronouncement on a political subject will command sufficient public approval to withstand the scrutiny
of time? It is this question that others have answered by reference to
the logic of a decision, or to the intuitive appeal of the interpretive
approach. But no one has explored the mechanics of how the political
branches (through floor statements by legislators, for example) establish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions.
To be sure, scholars have begun the long-awaited excavation of
these fascinating cases. And existing literature has already succeeded
in documenting the consequences of the Court's rulings and recognizing the Insular Cases as part of broader historical trends. Still, a number of antecedent questions have been left unanswered: Why did the
Supreme Court intervene in these matters in the first place? Should
the overtly political character of the issues implicated by the Insular
Cases have convinced the Supreme Court to withhold discretionary
review, rather than decide the status of territories acquired by conquest and treaty? After all, these were concerns that Justice Joseph
McKenna explicitly raised in his dissenting opinion in De Lima: "It is
not for the judiciary to question it. It involves circumstances which the
8
Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations ofJudicial Supremacy: The President, the Supreme
Court, and Consitutional Leadership in US History 5 (Princeton 2007) (showing that political leaders

have advocated and actively thrust the Court into the role of interpreting the Constitution).
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judiciary can take no account of or estimate. It is essentially a political
function.... [E]ssentially the whole matter is legislative, not judicial.""
In the end, Justice McKenna's reproving argument against judicial
involvement went unheeded, and the Supreme Court effectively
extinguished a national political firestorm. The questions that linger a
full century later are why and how: Why did the Court feel comfortable involving itself? And how is it that the Court's dramatic intervention did not ignite a firestorm of its own?
II. JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
As described in Part I, the Insular Cases squarely came down in favor of American expansionism, removing the supposed constitutional
barriers to Congress's plans to maintain the new territories as satellite
colonies indefinitely. As Justice McKenna said with respect to one representative case, De Lima ultimately did "more than declare [the legality of sugar duties]. It vindicate[d] the government from national and
international weakness [and] enable[d] the United States to havewhat it was intended to have-'an equal station among the Powers of
the earth' [ ] to do all 'Acts and Things which Independent States may
of right do..'" But whether the Court's endorsement of American colonialism would settle the public debate depended, in turn, on whether
political leaders and the public would recognize the rulings as valid.
Remarkably, despite what was at stake, by the time the Insular Cases
were heard in 1901, the public actually expected the Supreme Courtrather than Congress or the President-to decide the status of the island territories and the future of American expansionism.
Thus, before describing a process that arguably legitimized the
Court's involvement, it is instructive to describe how, to everyone's surprise, the Insular Cases were in fact accepted by the public without significant backlash. Accordingly, Part II.A identifies several reasons why public acquiescence was quite unlikely; Part H.B reports that, despite these
reasons, the Insular Cases were received as the valid and final word on
what had previously been a fierce, combustible political debate.
A.

The Anticipated Outcome

There were at least five reasons for why the public may have rejected the Supreme Court's decisions in the Insular Cases.

89

9

De Lima, 182 US at 208,219 (McKenna dissenting).
Id at 220 (quotations marks omitted).
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First, the public had good reasons to think that the Court's intervention improperly encroached on the independence of the political
branches to conduct foreign affairs and sign international treaties. Indeed, in several pre-1900 cases, the Court signaled that disputes involving treaties and foreign relations were beyond the judiciary's
proper reach.9 Two cases in particular illustrate this point. First, in Doe
v Braden -on

its surface, a simple property dispute-the Court re-

fused to consider claims challenging the validity of a treaty with a foreign nation." The opening line of Chief Justice Roger Taney's opinion
read: "This controversy has arisen out of the treaty with Spain by
which Florida was ceded to the United States."9 The Court sought to
discourage objections to the validity of the treaty on the ground that,
if treaty-based disputes became routine, "it would be impossible for
the executive department ... to conduct our foreign relations ... and

fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it."95 The
Braden Court acknowledged its "duty to interpret [a treaty] and administer it according to its terms,"9 but also expressed a general reluctance for courts to intervene when issues typically negotiated and settled by treaty are at stake.
Similarly, in Foster v Neilson,7 the Court declined to settle a disagreement that hinged on a boundary dispute that had been the subject
of protracted negotiations between Spain and the United States.9 The
Court relied on Fosterto hold in a later case that even "when individual
rights depended on [those] boundaries," "the settlement of boundaries
[is not] a judicial but a political question."" The Court believed a contrary ruling threatened to interfere with foreign negotiations. In light of
these cases, and given that the precise designation of United States territories after the Spanish-American War implicated both treaty interpretations and America's negotiations with foreign powers, the issues

91 In United States v Arredondo, 31 US 691 (1832), for example, the Court explained "the

judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its interests against
foreign powers is confided." Id at 711, citing Fosterv Neilson, 27 US 253, 307 (1829). As a consequence, in drawing territorial boundary lines, the Court held that "it was not its duty to lead, but
to follow the action of the other departments of the government." Arredondo,31 US at 711.
9
57 US 635 (1853).
93Id
at 657.
9
Id at 654.
95Id at 657.
96 57 US at 657.

27 US 253 (1829).
Id at 307,314.
99 Arredondo, 31 US at 711, citing Foster,27 US at 307.
9

9
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raised and resolved by the Insular Cases may have been viewed by the
public as far beyond the bailiwick of the Court.
Second, it was no secret to the public that the Court was addressing a set of highly political questions." In fact, this widespread perception was explicitly observed in a report to the Senate Judiciary Committee: "[T]he gravity of the issues at stake has created an impression
that the question of the Philippines is not properly a question of law,
but lies within that domain of policy into which the Supreme Court
will not intrude."o'
Third, for many, the lessons and consequences of the Court's
prior intervention in Dred Scott remained in view, and some feared
that the Insular Cases risked an equally sharp public rebuke.'" Indeed,
express references to Dred Scott during congressional debates over
the Insular Cases served as reminders of the open hostility the Court's
decisions might engender. For example, Maine Congressman Charles
Littlefield objected to judicial involvement in the debate over expansionism by referring to President Abraham Lincoln's scathing criticism
of the Court's prior role in Dred Scott: "Abraham Lincoln, in his great
debate with Douglas, bitterly and savagely attacked the Supreme
100 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3723 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Rep Mondell) (probing "if the question [about the tariff bill for Puerto Rico] is a constitutional
one"); Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 110 (cited in note 1) (noting that Attorney
General John Griggs and Solicitor General John Richards believed the Insular Cases decided
political questions).
101 Randolph, TerritorialExpansion at 7 (cited in note 8). See also L.S. Rowe, The Supreme

Court and the Insular Cases, 18 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 38,38-39 (1901).
102

See, for example, Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln on the Dred Scott Decision

(June 26, 1857), online at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=52
(visited Jan 29, 2010):
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and
without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with
the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part, based
on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had
been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a
course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent. But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the
public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as
not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country?
Indeed, both prior and subsequent Court decisions have been susceptible to widespread
public resistance. See, for example, Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 4 (1958) (addressing a claim by
the governor of Arkansas-who dispatched the Arkansas National Guard to impede the integration of a Little Rock high school-that state officials were not bound by the holding in Brown v
Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), which declared public school segregation unconstitutional). See also Worcester v Georgia, 31 US 515 (1832), which prompted President Andrew
Jackson's oft-quoted rejoinder: "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."
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Court for its decision in the Dred Scott case."M" Senator Henry Teller
similarly referred to Dred Scott as an example of Congress's capacity
to overrule a decision of the Court, if the Court improperly meddled in
political matters: "I do not say that you can not change the decisions of
the court by changing the Constitution. We changed the Constitution in
order to meet the opinion in the Dred Scott case."" A comparable public rejection was conceivable because "controversial literature," along
with public debates about the InsularCases (inside and outside of Congress) had "led... to a bitterness which ... resemble[d] the controver-

sies over the Fugitive Slave Law and the Missouri Compromise," as one
commentator noted.i

Fourth, public opinion was not sufficiently one-sided to suggest
that one outcome might be more palatable to the polity than another.
In fact, the country appeared deeply and evenly divided. The presidential election results of 1900 provide some measure of the disagreement."' Incumbent President William McKinley waged the SpanishAmerican War; helped acquire the islands of Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Philippines; and ardently advocated in favor of their incorporation. Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan, in contrast, ran
on an anti-imperialist platform, casting American expansionism as the
principal voting issue." Likewise in Congress, American expansionism
was considered a significant, if not the key, determinant of the 1900
election.'" The election results therefore provide a crude barometer of
103 57 Cong, 1st Sess, in 35 Cong Rec H 343 (Dec 17, 1901) (statement of Rep Littlefield)
(arguing that the Downes decision is similar to the Dred Scott decision in that both holdings
allow for the exploitation of a people). See also Charles E. Littlefield, The InsularCases, 15 Harv
L Rev 169,175 (1901).
104 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3671 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Teller). Senator
Teller ultimately went on to warn against relying on this mechanism, noting: "You know how
much it cost." Id.
105 Coudert, 26 Colum L Rev at 823 (cited in note 81). See also Sparrow, Emergence of
American Empire at 5 (cited in note 1) ("Observers at the time reported that the Insular Cases
aroused more political passion than had any action by the Supreme Court since its decision in

Dred Scott v. Sanford.").
106 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3718 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Rep Thomas) ("The question of expansion, or imperialism,... is one of the issues on which the
next national campaign will be fought."); Coudert, 26 Colum L Rev at 823 (cited in note 81)
("The election of 1900 largely turned upon the so-called issue of imperialism.").
107

See, for example, Bryan Praisesthe Irish:Democratic CandidateAddresses United Socie-

ties of Cook County, NY Times 3 (Aug 16, 1900) ("No matter to what party you may belong, no
matter with what party you shall cast your vote, I pray you to so cast your vote as to preserve
that doctrine of human liberty as the binding force in this country.").
108 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1995 (Feb 20, 1900) (statement of
Rep Payne) ("It is unfortunate that we should go into a great Presidential contest over a question involving extra territorial policy."). The Anti-Imperialist League declared, although surely in
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the degree of disagreement: McKinley won 7.2 million votes, while
Bryan collected roughly 6.3 million votes.'.Using the same barometer,
a report to the Senate Judiciary Committee suggested that the Court
was likely to interpret the election returns as a gauge of public sentiment: "[Als some having greater respect for the [political] powers
than for the integrity of the Court say, its judgment will reflect what
they assume is the popular desire to exploit the islands with a free
hand.,,.o Under these circumstances, there was little reason to think
that the public was poised to embrace the Supreme Court's decision.
Finally, the Insular Cases concerned divisive controversies that
could easily have been construed as political questions, which ordinarily would have precluded the Court's involvement."' The remainder
of Part II explores this possibility in greater detail.
To do so, it first explains, by reference to the political question
doctrine as it stood at the time, that the putatively legal issues presented in the Insular Cases could have been construed as political
questions. Second, it looks to what the justices themselves said and to
the key political and policy considerations that dominated their opinions. Part II.A concludes by presenting evidence of the surrounding
historical context in order to document the far-reaching political implications and manifestly political nature of the very issues the Court
resolved. These observations are not intended to establish that the
Insular Cases undoubtedly involved political questions, but only to
suggest that the Court could credibly have avoided hearing the cases
on that basis.

part from wishful thinking, that the decision to retain the island possession was the central issue
of the 1900 campaign. See Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 64 (cited in note 75) ("The status
of the territories quickly became a prominent issue in the 1900 presidential campaign.").

1

E. Berkeley Tompkins, Scylla and Charybdis:The Anti-imperialistDilemma in the Elec-

tion of 1900,36 Pac Hist Rev 143,160 (1967).
110 Randolph, TerritorialExpansion at 7 (cited in note 8).

111See, for example, Luther v Borden, 48 US 1,47 (1849) (holding that the determination of
whether Rhode Island's charter government was effectively annulled through a vote of its citizens is a political question and not within the Court's power); Baker v Carr,369 US 186, 217
(1962); Vieth v Jubelirer,541 US 267, 305 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality); id at 311 (Kennedy concurring) (noting the lack of a judicially manageable standard but declining to answer the question
definitively since one may "emerge in the future," allowing the question to become justiciable);
League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 414 (2006) ("A plurality of the

Court in Vieth would have held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a
majority declined to do so."). See also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of
the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 Colum L Rev 237, 246-86
(2002); Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 Yale L J 597,601-25 (1976).
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1. Doctrine indicates political core.
From the time of Marbury v Madison,"' it has been settled that
political questions are not appropriate for judicial resolution: "Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."".. By
1901, when the Court considered the Insular Cases, the doctrine had
developed sufficiently to establish that, as a matter of law, the Court
could have declined to consider the cases (absent the "consent and
certify" process I identify and defend in Parts III and IV). Several
considerations support this view.
a) Lack of judicial standards. One of the main touchstones of

early political question doctrine was the absence of judicial standards.
Thus, in his 1924 survey of the doctrine, Oliver Field referred to a
number of pre-1900 cases and offered the following synopsis of the
law at the time:
It is true that the courts have not formulated any very clear conception of the doctrine of political questions, nor have they always
acted upon the same general principles. But a reading of the cases
seems to warrant the statement that the most important factor in
the formulation of the doctrine is that stated above, namely, a lack
of legal principles to apply to the questions presented."'
For example, in 1849, the lack of legal standards prompted the Supreme Court to decline to decide the case of Luther v Borden."' The
Court was asked to determine whether a particular state government
was "republican" within the meaning of the Guarantee Clause of the

5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id at 170. More modern formulations elaborated upon early political question doctrine,
setting forth a number of additional criteria that could help identify a political question. See, for
example, Baker, 369 US at 217:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
114 Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the FederalCourts, 8 Minn L Rev
485,512 (1924).
112
113

115 48 US 1, 41-42,47 (1849).
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Constitution.'"6 This meant the Court needed to determine whether the
state convention had voted against or in favor of forming a new government, but the Court had no means of taking a census, for example,
to see who voted. In light of these practical difficulties and the absence of typical judicial standards to settle the dispute, the Court
found that the task of specifying whether a state was "republican,"
even when that task is described as an interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause, rests with Congress."'
From this perspective, the Insular Cases arguably posed political
questions. After all, just as Luther had sought the Court's opinion as to
whether a state government was "republican," the Insular Cases requested that the Court offer its view on whether a United States territory was "foreign" or "domestic." That question, in turn, was not susceptible to ordinary legal standards. No prior cases supplied judicially
manageable criteria for deciding if a territory was foreign or domestic
anymore than for evaluating whether a government was republican in
form. On the contrary, the Supreme Court had at least once previously
insisted that the elected branches of government designate a territory's political status: "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges.""' Moreover, as Part II.B explains, the
absence of judicial standards in the Insular Cases-or their relative
insignificance -was confirmed by the justices' heavy reliance on political and policy considerations concerning what was better for the future prospects of American expansionism.
Thus, although the cases technically involved the Uniformity
Clause and various federal tariff laws, the answer to each of the putatively legal questions depended (just as in Borden) upon a political
determination of "what was 'domestic' and what was 'foreign.'""' As
116 Id at 38 (noting that the Court had to decide whether Rhode Island's temporary "charter government had no legal existence" between 1841 and 1842, in which case "the laws passed
by its legislature during that time were nullities"); id at 26-27, citing US Const Art IV, § 4.
117 Borden,48 US at 42.
118 Jones v United States, 137 US 202, 212 (1890) (finding that it is well-settled precedent in
the United States and England that the legislative and executive branches determine the sovereignty of a territory).
119 Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 80 (cited in note 1). See, for example, 56
Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2037 (Feb 21,1900) (statement of Rep Bromwell):

[I1f we regard the ports of Puerto Rico as foreign ports, we are in the same position as if we
were to undertake by law to levy a duty upon goods exported from any port in the United
States into England, France, or any foreign country. On the other hand, if we look upon the
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one political commentator said referring to the status of the newly
acquired territories: "The decisions have served to bring out with great
clearness the peculiar position occupied by the Supreme Court. Unlike any other tribunal, it is at times called upon to pass on questions
which, while legal in form, are political in substance, profoundly affecting the fabric of our institutions."120
b) Delegation by law and treaty. A second significant factor,

which was announced by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury itself, was whether the question had been committed "by the constitution and laws" to one of the elected branches of government. 2 ' This
too supports the conclusion that the Insular Cases answered political
questions, since (1) the political status of the territories was an issue
that had been unequivocally submitted to Congress by treaty, and
(2) all matters of governance of United States territories were expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
In fact, the Treaty of Paris could hardly have been clearer as to
Congress's responsibility and designated role: "The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."," Accordingly, the Department of War's annual report declared that the residents of Puerto Rico were "subject to the complete sovereignty of [the
United States], controlled by no legal limitations except those which
may be found in the treaty of cession."'2 Significantly, vesting authori-

ports of Puerto Rico as domestic ports, then we are met with the controlling provision of
the Constitution.
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2038 (Feb 21, 1900) (statement of Rep Ray) ("Now, if the
authors of the Standard Dictionary are correct [that an export refers only to goods traded to a
foreign country] ... then that settles the proposition, does it not? [B]ecause Puerto Rico is not a
foreign country."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 2131 (Feb 23, 1900) (statement of Sen
Vest) ("Is Puerto Rico a part of the United States or not? Will some Senator on the other side
answer me that question and remove any nebulosity about this argument? Is Puerto Rico a part
of the United States or entirely outside of its domain and jurisdiction?").
120 Rowe, 18 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 38 at 38-39 (cited in note 101).
121 5 US (1 Cranch) at 170. Chief Justice John Marshall gave two examples of political
questions that the judiciary should refuse to entertain because they have been constitutionally
delegated to a coordinate branch of government: (1) the executive power to nominate and appoint political representatives, and (2) actions performed by an executive officer in foreign affairs at the direction of the President. See id at 166-67.
122 Treaty of Paris Art IX, 30 Stat at 1759 (emphasis added).
123

Jos6 Trias Monge, Injustice According to Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities,in

Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 226, 227 (cited in note 23). See also Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1328 at 230 (Little, Brown
3d ed 1858) ("The power of congress over the public territory is clearly exclusive and universal;
and their legislation is subject to no control, but is absolute and unlimited, unless so far as it is
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ty in Congress to specify the "political status" of Puerto Ricans was
neither an accident nor a matter of course. The Treaty of Guadalupe in
1848, for example, had left to Congress only the timing of when Mexicans would become United States citizens, not what their political
status would be under the Constitution.' And congressmen noted this
difference -between the Treaty of Paris and prior territorial treaties to show that, in contrast to the political designation of prior acquisitions of land, the status of the territories obtained from Spain in 1900
had been left exclusively to Congress.
Even apart from the Treaty of Paris, the Constitution itself explicitly granted to Congress full governance authority over United States
territories. Article IV of the Constitution states: "Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States."' 2 During a debate about Congress's power to govern the territories, Senator Joseph Foraker- architect of the Foraker Act' pointed to this constitutional delegation of power to justify his view that
it was Congress's task to determine Puerto Rico's political fate:
We find in [the Constitution] a grant of power to the United
States Government to make war, a grant of power to make treaties, each and both carrying along with it and with them the pow-

affected by stipulations in the cessions, or by the ordinance of 1787, under which any part of it
has been settled.").
124 See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, 9
Stat 922, Treaty Ser No 207 (1848) ("Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo") (emphasis added):
[The] Mexicans who ... shall not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican republic ... shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the
proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all
the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the [C]onstitution.
12 See 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3719 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Rep Thomas)
(noting that the treaties for the Louisiana Purchase and Mexican Cession intended "eventually
to admit all [of that] territory" and inhabitants "to statehood and citizenship," while the Treaty of
Paris gave Congress the power to decide future statehood and citizenship status). Compare
Louisiana Purchase Treaty Art 111, 8 Stat 200, Treaty Ser 86 (1803); Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
Art IX, 9 Stat at 922 with Treaty of Paris Art IX, 30 Stat at 1759.
126 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2. Of course, the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, also had constitutional treatymaking power, which augmented the political branches'
authority with respect to the territories the United States inherited after the Spanish-American
War. See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
127 See note 60.
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er also to acquire territory and, as a result of that, the power to
govern territory.2
Thus, in the end, between Article IV and the Treaty of Paris, it
seems clear that Puerto Rico's political status was at least as much a
question for the people and the elected branches of government as it
was an issue for the courts.
2. Justices recognize political core.
This analysis is reinforced by the justices' own statements and the
postures they assumed in their opinions. Several justices explicitly
recognized the political nature of the issues raised in the Insular Cases. Justice McKenna, for example, said in his dissent in De Lima:
"Upon what degree of civilization could civil and political rights under
the Constitution be awarded by courts? The question suggests the difficulties, and how essentially the whole matter is legislative, not judicial."129 Even Justice Brown, the critical fifth vote in Downes, acknowledged the close proximity between the questions before the Court and
classic political questions: "Patriotic and intelligent men may differ
widely as to the desireableness of this or that acquisition, but this is
solely a political question."m
Moreover, throughout the decisions, the justices depended upon
political and policy-based considerations of what position would least
endanger the security, prosperity, and growth of the country -the very
kind of arguments the political branches would ordinarily contemplate. The opinions of the two leading authors of the Insular Cases are
especially instructive on this point. Justice Brown, who wrote eight of
the Court's nine opinions, declared in Downes:
[N]o construction of the Constitution should be adopted which
would prevent Congress from considering each [newly acquired
territory] upon its merits, unless the language of the instrument
imperatively demand it. A false step at this time might be fatal to
the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called the Amer.
.
131
ican empire.

128

Winfred Lee Thompson, The Introduction ofAmerican Law in the Philippines and Puer-

to Rico: 1898-1905 44 (Arkansas 1989). See also Ramos, 65 Revista Juridica Universidad Puerto
Rico at 322 (cited in note 4).
129 182 US at 219 (McKenna dissenting).
130 182 US at 286.
131 Id.
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He added: "Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the
annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions, and modes of life, shall
become at once citizens of the United States." 2
Similarly, Justice White, whose theory of incorporation the Court
adopted in later territorial governance cases, elaborated on the importance of flexibility in order to acquire and cede territories as needed:
If the authority by treaty is limited as is suggested, then it will be
impossible to terminate a successful war by acquiring territory
through a treaty, without immediately incorporating such territory into the United States.

...

Suppose the necessity of acquiring a

naval station or a coaling station on an island inhabited with
people utterly unfit for American citizenship and totally incapable of bearing their proportionate burden of the national expense. Could such island, under the rule which is now insisted
upon, be taken? ... Can it be denied that, if the requirements of

the Constitution as to taxation are to immediately control, it
might be impossible by treaty to accomplish the desired result? 33
Astonishingly, Justice White admitted that the opposite view-even if
rooted in an interpretation of the Constitution-would rest upon political considerations unsuitable for judicial analysis:
[I]t is said that the spirit of the Constitution excludes the conception of property or dependencies possessed by the United
States ... that the theory upon which the Constitution proceeds is

that of confederated and independent states, and that no territory,
therefore, can be acquired which does not contemplate statehood,
and excludes the acquisition of any territory which is not in a position to be treated as an integral part of the United States. But this
reasoning is based on political,and not judicial,considerations.I

Hence, it seems apparent that the justices were cognizant of the political implications of the issues they were deciding; yet, either explicitly
or implicitly, instead of attempting to navigate away from visible political shoals, they steered their opinions directly into them.

132

Id at 279-80.

133

Id at 311 (White concurring).

134

Downes, 182 US at 311-12 (White concurring) (emphasis added).
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3. Context confirms political core.
American reign over Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines
represented a "great departure""' because the country had never before governed such heavily populated and far-flung territories.'6 Not
surprisingly then, continuing control of these conquests well after the
end of the war-a departure from the traditional treatment of territories such as New Mexico and California'3 -ignited an incendiary na138
tional debate that divided the American public and political parties.
Indeed, not since Dred Scott had the country been so divisively splintered,'" and all sides claimed that the stakes had never been higher:
The question of expansion, or imperialism ... is one that is and

has been for some time past agitating the minds of the American
people. It is fraught with tremendous consequences to the Republic. It is one of the issues on which the next national campaign
will be fought. It is not only a question of the greatest interest to
me and every American citizen, but in my humble opinion it is
the most important question presented to the citizens of this
country since the first shot at Sumter in 1861.'40
135 Beisner, Twelve against Empire at 237 (cited in note 79) ("[I]t was a departure from
traditional American practice to acquire distant, heavily populated colonies for which statehood
was not intended.").
136 See, for example, Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 4 (cited in note 1)
("[N]ever before had the United States added areas this populated and this remote from Ameri-

can shores."); Charles Morris, Our Island Empire: A Hand-Book of Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii,
and the PhilippineIslands xii (Lippincott 1899).
137 Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases, in Bur-

nett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 140, 148 (cited in note 23).
138 As the New York World reported, "Legal and political opinion was never so divided." Vital
PrinciplesEmbodied in Test Cases, NY World (May 27,1901). See also Coudert, 26 Colum L Rev at
823 (cited in note 81) (observing "how fervent a controversy raged some twenty-five or more years
ago," one which "divided not only courts, judges and lawyers, but public opinion generally").
The legal academy also sharply disagreed. While scholars including Christopher Columbus
Langdell (former dean of Harvard Law School), Charles A. Gardiner (New York Bar Association), and James Bradley Thayer (Harvard Law professor) believed that the United States consisted only of the states, others like Judge Simeon Baldwin and Carmen Randolph understood
the United States to include both the states and the territories. See Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 40-41 (cited in note 1).
139 See Cabranes, 100 Harv L Rev at 455 (cited in note 82).
140 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3718 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Rep Thomas). And
Representative Thomas was not alone. For example, in reference to Puerto Rico, Representative
James D. Richardson said on the House floor: "Mr. Chairman, I am not an alarmist....With this
much of preface of a personal character, I begin by saying that in my judgment the pending bill is
more dangerous to the liberties of the people of this Republic than any measure ever before
seriously presented to the American Congress." 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1947
(Feb 19,1900) (statement of Rep Richardson).
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Some insisted that holding the islands as colonies would cast doubt
upon defining features of the country's identity and betray the principles of self-governance that animated the American Revolution."'
Presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, for example, reminded
the country:
To-day, in the presence of a great and overshadowing issue, it is
well for us to remember that we have brought the people from
the Old World with the promise that here they shall get liberty as
it was taught by the fathers. If to-day we are willing to abandon
those principles, then we must stand before the world convicted
of having brought people here under false pretenses. 2
Similarly, as one legal scholar framed the debate, the central question
was "whether the people approve the policy of abandoning the Declaration of Independence, turning the Republic into an Empire, and
transforming a peaceful democracy into an imperial conqueror,"" while
for another, "[tihe 'giant issue now,' '[was] whether the flag shall stand
for freedom or oppression."'" Former Vermont Senator George F. Edmunds asked in equally dramatic terms whether the country would betray its founding principles and forget its own history:
The expansion and dominations, now almost encircling the globe,
entered upon by Congress have cost the people of the United
States a very great expenditure of blood and treasure, and a severe
shock to the ideas of liberty, self-government and equality which
used to be thought fundamental, and which we professed (sincerely, it is to be hoped) when we declared war against Spain.
141 Bryan Praisesthe Irish, NY Times at 3 (cited in note 107) (proclamation of the United
Irish Societies of Cook County):
Within the year freedom has received desperate blows at the hands of nations who claim to
be wedded to liberty, and we regret to say that the foreign policy of our own American Republic has exhibited a desire on the part of our Government to share in the seizure of territory, which is the distinguishing mark of the nation that throttled liberty upon this continent, burned its Capitol at Washington ....

Brook Thomas, A Constitution Led by the Flag:The Insular Cases and the Metaphor of Incorpo-

ration, in Burnett and Marshall, eds, Foreign in a Domestic Sense 82, 84 (cited in note 23) (arguing that "what was at stake" in the Insular Cases was "how the United States thought of itself -or themselves-as a nation").
142 Bryan Praisesthe Irish, NY Times at 3 (cited in note 107). See also Rowe, 18 Annals Am
Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 38-39 (cited in note 101) (denouncing colonialism as "profoundly affecting the fabric of our institutions").
143 Tompkins, 36 Pac Hist Rev at 153 (cited in note 109).
144 Id at 153, quoting Frank Parsons, The GiantIssue of 1900,23 The Arena 561,561 (1900).
145 George E Edmunds, The Insular Cases, 537 N Am Rev 145,153 (1901).
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For some, a failure to expand the country's territorial expanse threatened to delay America's ascension to its rightful place as a great power.' For others, what path America chose risked imperiling the country's very existence. AS the Democratic platform proclaimed:
[T]hat all governments instituted among men derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed; that any government
not based upon the consent of the governed is a tyranny; and that
to impose upon any people a government of force is to substitute
the methods of imperialism for those of a republic.... We assert
that no nation can long endure half republic and half empire, and
we warn the American people that imperialism abroad will lead
quickly and inevitably to despotism at home.
Yet, despite the intense concentration of political attention on the subject, the Court agreed to hear the InsularCases and thus injected itself
into a deeply contentious political debate.
In light of (1) the doctrine at the time, (2) the justices' statements
and opinions in the cases themselves, and (3) the surrounding circumstances, it seems at least fair to say that the Supreme Court could have
validly declined (and perhaps should have refused) to resolve the cases. But just as these considerations indicate that the Court could have
turned the cases down, they also suggest that the public and their political leaders would likely resist, and afterwards object to, any unwarranted interference by the Court. Yet, as Part II.B reports, the Court
did not decline the cases, nor did politicians or the public dispute the
legitimacy of the decisions once they were delivered.
B.

The Actual Outcome

Political leaders and the public could have marginalized and ignored the Supreme Court's involvement in the debate over American
expansionism; instead, throughout the process, they elected to watch
146 See De Lima, 182 US at 220 (McKenna dissenting). Justice McKenna, for example,
noted that declaring the legality of the sugar duties "vindicate[d] the government from national
and international weakness" and "enable[d] the United States to have-what it was intended to
have-'an equal station among the Powers of the earth,' and to do all 'Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do."' Id.
147 See, for example, James C. Fernald, The Imperial Republic 9 (Funk & Wagnalls 1899)
("Imperialism, in the sense of despotic rule, can have no place in our American republic, except
by the destruction of the republic itself, and the extirpation of the American ideal.").
148

John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds, The American Presidency Project: Democratic

Party Platform of 1900 (University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009), online at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=29587 (visited Jan 29,2010).

2010]1

The PoliticalRoots of JudicialLegitimacy

815

the Insular Cases closely." As the New York World declared, "No case

ever attracted wider attention."M" The New York World also reported
that the public was feverishly watching to see if the Court would
uphold the "McKinley policy of imperialism."' The day the cases were
announced, attendance at the Court reflected this widespread interest:
The bare rumor that the court would render its decision in the insular test suits was sufficient to create an interest among all sorts
and conditions of people in Washington that sent them to the
Capitol in a frenzy of excitement. They realized that no such
momentous issues affecting the growth and progress of the nation are likely again to come before the tribunal of last resort for
arbitrament, and every man who was fortunate enough to gain
access to the chamber during the delivery of the opinions appreciated that he was witnessing one of the most tremendous events
in the nation's life."'
What is more, the New York Daily Tribune observed the attendance of
political and military leaders in the courtroom on that day: "No such
crowd either as to numbers or distinguished personnel has been seen
in the Supreme Court room as that assembled there today.".5.
According to some, the attention and scrutiny the Court received
was due to the fact that its decisions were expected to settle once and
for all this "strong and furious" debate.'5 But, upon announcement of
the decisions, predictions surfaced that the Insular Cases would be
renounced and ultimately reversed. A New York Times editorial, for
example, predicted that Downes would "share the fate of the Dred
Scott decision."15 5
In the end, however, the Court's decisions appeared to silence political and public debate rather than set it off. Peter Dunne's cartoon featuring the fictitious Mr. Dooley captured the widespread view that the Court
would ultimately settle the debate over expansionism, and reflected the

149 See Charles Warren, 3 The Supreme Court in United States History 430 (Little, Brown

1924) (describing the cases as a "judicial drama of truly Olympian proportions" that "entered
immediately into the political arena" and "constituted by far the most important fact in the
Court's history during the period since (Justice] Waite's death").
150 Constitution Follows Flag: Porto Rico Tariff Legal, NY World 1 (May 27,1901).
151 Vital PrinciplesEmbodied in Test Cases,NY World (cited in note 138).
152 Insular Suits Decided: Government Wins a Big Victory and Loses a Minor Point, NY

Daily Trib 1,2 (May 28, 1901).
153 Id.

154 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1946 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Payne).
155 The Court and the Opinions,NY Times 8 (May 29,1901).
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public's perception that the Court could validly engage questions concerning the political status of the newly acquired territories:
"I see," said Mr. Dooley, "th' Supreme Coort has decided th'
Constitution don't follow th' flag."
"Who said it did?" asked Mr. Hennessy.
"Some wan," said Mr. Dooley. "It happened a long time ago an' I
don't raymimber clearly how it come up, but some fellow said that
ivrywhere th' Constitution wint, th' flag was sure to go. 'I don't believe wan wurrud iv it,' says th' other fellow. 'Ye can't make me
think th' Constitution is goin' thrapezin' around ivrywhere a young
liftnant in th' ar-rmy takes it into his head to stick a flag pole. It's too
old. It's a home-stayin' Constitution with a blue coat with brass buttons onto it, an' it walks with a goold-headed cane....
'But,' says th' other,'if it wants to thravel, why not lave it?' 'But it
don't want to.' 'I say it does.' 'How'll we find out?' 'We'll ask th'
Supreme Coort.'["]f
Ultimately, even those who doubted the reasoning and consistency of
the rulings nevertheless accepted them as the authoritative and final
judgment on American expansionism." Indeed, Puerto Rico and Guam
continue to be "unincorporated territories" of the United States. And
the Insular Cases remained not only valid law throughout the twentieth
century,'m but in June 2008 also provided important constitutional
precedent for determining where and to whom the freedoms of the
Constitution would apply."' As Justice Anthony Kennedy declared in
Bournediene: "Yet noting the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing
all constitutional provisions always and everywhere, the Court devised
in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly
and where it would be most needed. This century-old doctrine inforrs
our analysis in the presentmatter.","
156 Finley Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in Elmer Ellis, ed, Mr. Dooley at
His Best 72,72-73 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1938).
157 See Edmunds, 537 N Am Rev at 147 (cited in note 145).
158 See, for example, Torres v Puerto Rico, 442 US 465, 475 (1979) (Brennan concurring)

(declining to extend but not overruling Downes). See also In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees

Litigation, 479 F Supp 2d 85, 99-100 (DDC 2007) (recognizing and respecting the Insular Cases
when holding that constitutional protections, such as the Fifth Amendment right to be free of
torture, did not extend to aliens detained in Afghanistan and Iraq); Tauber, 57 Case W Res L Rev
at 148 (cited in note 71).
159 See Boumediene, 128 S Ct at 2236-37.
160 Id at 2255 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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III. "CONSENT AND CERTIFY":
RENDERING POLITICAL QUESTIONS JUSTICIABLE

The acquiescence of the political branches and the public to the
Supreme Court's decisions in the Insular Cases was rather remarkable.
How the country reached such a point, where it was not only acceptable
but indeed appropriate for the judicial branch to settle what for years
had been a profoundly political dispute, may be explained by the actions of Congress and the President. For in the years preceding the Insular Cases, the branches ordinarily responsible for answering political
questions entrusted the Court to resolve them instead. Thus, members
of both the executive and legislative branches explicitly called for and
implicitly endorsed judicial arbitration of a national dispute.
In an effort to explain why the Court's pronouncements were not
publicly repudiated, this Part identifies and elaborates upon steps political actors took that made it more appropriate for the Supreme
Court to address the controversial and deeply political questions presented by the Insular Cases. These actions constituted a transformative process by which fundamentally political questions were converted into justiciable ones.
In particular, the political branches appear to have taken five sets
of steps that preauthorized and laid the groundwork for the Supreme
Court's intervention: (1) disavowing the legitimacy of the legislature's
consideration of the matter, (2) publicly inviting the Court to mediate
the controversy, (3) endorsing the validity of judicial intervention,
(4) casting the political issue in legal and constitutional terms, and
(5) proposing nonlegal factors as a basis for the Court's decision that
would compensate for the absence of traditional judicial standards.
A. Disavowing the Legitimacy of the Legislature's Consideration of
the Matter
Toward the end of the Spanish-American War, the country was
divided over the morality and wisdom of expansionism. Both chambers of Congress were gripped by a fractious, bitter debate over the
power to govern far-reaching islands through specific territorial legislation. Interestingly, during these debates, many members vocally disclaimed political authority to settle the dispute, arguing that the political arena was an improper forum in which to decide this particular
issue. The reasons behind this view varied.
Senator George E Hoar, for example, warned of the risks of deciding the politically charged issue in chambers dominated by public passions, skeptical of those who thought "that the policy and the destiny of
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this people are to be better settled in crowded assembles, with shouting
and clapping of hands and stamping of feet."'. Others questioned the
wisdom of congressional debate when the controversy had become
plainly politicized in the days preceding the presidential election:
I think it is unfortunate that we have attempted at this time to legislate upon this subject. I do not mean to say it offensively, but it
is apparent to everybody that this bill has been a plaything of
politics here. On one side the Republicans have been trying to
make capital out of it, and, as a matter of course, the other side
have tried to make capital against it.
Accordingly, Senator Teller also believed that if Congress were to decide the legitimacy of American expansionism, it should only be done
after the 1900 presidential election. Teller and others feared that expansionism would be exploited as an electoral issue and used to pander to the public.' Moreover, allowing the political branches of government to resolve the matter suffered from the usual problems of
democracy, leaving the issue vulnerable to special interests'" and sud-

161

Senator Hoar's Views: Extractsfrom His Address at Worcester, Mass, 55 Friends' Intelli-

gencer 831, 831 (Nov 12, 1898) (preferring that decisions affecting the American people be settled like "they were of old in the quiet chamber where Madison and Hamilton sat in council").
162 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3685 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Teller).
163 Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 64 (cited in note 75) ("The floor debate became a
conglomerate of long-winded speeches, often appearing to be addressed to the press rather than
to members of the House.").
164 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3672 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Sen Mason) ("What can we say to the laboring men .... They are not for this bill."); 56 Cong, 1st
Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3710 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Rep Robinson) ("[I]n these troublous
times of acquiring and governing outlying island possessions and efforts at once to sustain the
Constitution the interest of labor seems neglected."); id at 3710 ("We affirm our previous position on this question, namely, that there must be no slavery or serfdom by ownership or contract
tolerated under the American flag, and that we will make anyone whose action shall in any way
militate against this principle of human freedom responsible for such action in every legitimate
manner open to us."), quoting American Federation of Labor, Report of the Proceedings of the
19th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 74 (James H. Stone & Co 1899)

(Dec 13, 1899); Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 63-64 (cited in note 75):
President McKinley, however, miscalculated the impact that his policy would have on American public opinion.The prospect of assimilating the "half-civilized Moros of the Philippines, or
the ignorant and lawless brigands that infested Puerto Rico" was enough to tame the wildest
of the expansionist spirits. The greatest opposition came from the private sector. The beet sugar and tobacco industries, fearing competition from the cheaper Puerto Rican and Filipino
products, launched a massive lobbying campaign against the free trade measure.... The American sugar and tobacco producers were not concerned with the Puerto Rican production; the
Puerto Rican yield was negligible compared to the total size of the market.
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den shifts in popular opinion.' Industry lobbyists, for example, supported American expansionism on the ground that the country's cotton trade with China would improve if the United States functionally
dictated Philippine economic and trade policy. In the face of these
special interests, Republican Congressman Joseph Lane of Iowa urged
his colleagues not to allow base political considerations to trump the
distinctively American principles that would have to be surrendered
should the nation accept the practice of ruling over territories that had
not given their consent to be governed:
Are we to sacrifice the principles of the Declaration of Independence to sell a few bales of cotton or a few bushels of wheat? Trade
is valuable; but, purchased by the sacrifice of the principles of the
Declaration of Independence and of the Farewell Address of Washington and of the Monroe doctrine, it is not worth the price."
Political leaders, seemingly moved by these objections (which were
raised in both chambers of Congress), acknowledged the need for an
alternate forum for deciding the legitimacy of territorial governance.
Senator Teller, for instance, expressed the view that the federal legislature could not provide a dispassionate forum in which to debate American expansionism, at least until after the presidential election: "I believe
if we had waited until after the coming Presidential election, we could
have sat down here deliberately, with less temptation to draw it into
politics than we have had; and we might have secured legislation better
than we are likely to secure under present conditions."..
See also Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 64 n 41 (cited in note 75) ("These industries were
afraid, however, that a grant of free trade to the Island would set a precedent that would bind
Congress when legislating for the Philippines.").
165 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3677 (Apr 3,1900) (statement of
Sen Mason) ("As I said before, the plain people will not stand it. God help the man who takes to
the people in November, and asks for an indorsement or a return to a seat here or at the other
end of the Capitol."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3724 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Rep
Boutell) ("Now, many of the newspaper extracts that were read by my eloquent and earnest
friend from Mississippi last week were in the nature of strictures upon members of the Republican party and criticisms upon their vote on what is known as the Puerto Rican bill.").
166 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3721 (Apr 3,1900) (statement of Rep Lane).
167 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3685 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Teller). For his
part, Congressman Sereno E. Payne recognized the political distortions created by the upcoming
presidential election but was not necessarily ready to shift responsibility to another branch of
government altogether, instead urging his colleagues not "to make some political capital for the
Presidential campaign" and thus entertaining the possibility of legislative deliberations free of
feverish political bargaining after the presidential election was over: "As patriots ... we should sit
down with deliberate, dispassionate judgment and consider the questions that confront us with
reference to these islands." 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1941 (Feb 19,1900) (statement of
Rep Payne) (discussing the trade of Puerto Rico).
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Ultimately, political leaders disclaimed the political process as the
appropriate venue in which to resolve the controversy over American
expansionism. Instead, as the next Part shows, the leaders of both parties crowned the Supreme Court as the superior forum.
B.

Publicly Inviting the Court to Mediate the Controversy

The political branches referred the dispute to the Supreme Court
through both explicit statements and implicit acknowledgments that
the Court was the appropriate final arbiter of expansionism. For example, the McKinley administration expressly invited the Court's intervention because it believed judicial scrutiny would legitimize United States governance of its territories. The New York Times reported
that Republican President McKinley "believed it advisable at the earliest moment to secure a decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutional question involved."'6 That same month, the United States Minister to Spain, the Honorable Perry Belmont (who served as a Democratic congressman before his appointment), suggested that the power the President and Congress sought to exercise over newly acquired
territories could be fairly characterized as illegitimate and imperialist
unless the Supreme Court said otherwise:
That new issue is well enough described as imperialism.... Its es-

sence is the claim that the President and Congress can govern,
unrestrained by the Constitution, all our territories which are not
States. It demands for the President and Congress as much power
over the Philippines and Porto Rico as Queen Victoria and Parliament have over India. It defies ... and denies the control of the
Supreme Court.'o

The Minister to Spain also expressly endorsed Supreme Court involvement as a means of curbing excesses of congressional power:
The Secretary of War... manifests an uneasiness over what a
possible future Congress and President may do, if the islands be
left exposed to legislation unrestrained by the Constitution. That
he prefers to rely on the spirit and nature of our fundamental law
rather than on its letter is perhaps immaterial provided the judi-

168

The President's Attitude: Has Not Changed His Opinion, but Approves House Bill, NY

Times 1 (Mar 7, 1900).
169 Mr Belmont on the Issue:Attacks the Administration's Expansion Policy- Will Work for

Mr Bryan's Election, NY Times 3 (Aug 16, 1900) (emphasis added).
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cial power can, in a proper case, sit in judgment on whatever
0
Congress may do. The essential thing is Constitutionalcontrol."

The Spanish Minister therefore proposed that "[t]hey might promote
a suit which should carry the question to the Supreme Court for a
prompt judgment."
Secretary of War Elihu Root agreed with the ambassador. He
wrote Senator John Morgan of Alabama on June 1, 1901, and said "the
power to impose duties in the Spanish islands, on goods coming from
the United States" would "better be settled by the Court than discussed in Congress where, after months of heated debate, it might result in conclusions only to be overruled by the Court."'
Explicit invitations soliciting judicial review also echoed through
both chambers of Congress, though they originated primarily from the
Republican side of the aisle. A debate on the House floor illustrates
how politicians expressly delegated final judgment authority of territorial governance to the Supreme Court specifically-and the judiciary more generally:
House Rep Neville: Who will decide what portions of the Constitution are locally applicable to the Hawaiian Islands, and under
what authority will that tribunal act in so deciding?
House Rep Knox: What portion of the Constitution and laws extended are applicable to the island will be a question for litigation in the courts.... We establish a Federal district court with a
jurisdiction of the circuit court, that upon constitutional questions appeal may be had and a writ of error may lie to the Supreme Court of the United States."

The resemblance between this exchange and the Mr. Dooley political
cartoon suggests how broadly shared this view may have been in the
public."' As Congressman John W. Gaines said:
Can Congress say what shall not be "contrary to the Constitution?" Of course not. That task is for the courts. It has been repeatedly held by our highest courts that a law passed by Territorial
legislatures "contrary to the Constitution of the United States is
170

Perry Belmont, The President's War Power and an Imperial Tariff, 170 N Am Rev 433,

444 (1900) (emphasis added).
171 Id at 439.
172 Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 124 (cited in note 1).
173 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3801 (Apr 5, 1900) (statement of Reps Neville and
Knox).
174 See note 156 and accompanying text.
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void," which goes to prove that Congress is without power to enact
laws beyond the limitation of or its powers granted."'
Aside from explicit solicitations, political leaders also invited
judicial review through congressional action. Representative George
W. Ray observed, for example, that the ambiguous wording of legislation invited judicial interpretation:
Indirectly, however, and as a necessary consequence of attempting to legislate at all regarding the management of affairs pertaining to the support and commercial control of this newly acquired Territory, using the word territory in the sense of peopled
land, and not in the sense of "territory" as applied to our organized Territories on the continent of North America, we open up
the whole question of the powers of Congress over Puerto Rico,
the Philippine Islands, and our Territories generally, and the
broad question whether or not new territory, territory acquired
since the Constitution was ordained and established ... is a part

of the United States in the political sense of that term, so that the
Constitution ... is, of its own force and vigor, and unaided by and

independent of any executive or legislative action.
Other members of Congress were more direct about crafting and
passing legislation in order to elicit judicial review. Congressman Sereno E. Payne, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
advocated enacting a law as a test case that would bring before the
Court the issue of territorial governance. Congressman Payne championed the Foraker bill on this basis:
If this bill is passed it will give the Supreme Court of the United
States the first opportunity it has ever had to meet that question
fairly and squarely and say whether the limitation for uniform
taxation in the United States refers to the United States or the
United States and the territory belonging to the United States. It
may be an important question to be considered in the future
when we come to legislate for the Philippine Islands, when we
come to legislate, if we have to, with respect to Cuba, and I think
it would be a good proposition to submit that question now to
the Supreme Court.'

56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2000 (Feb 20,1900) (statement of Rep Gaines).
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2034 (Feb 21, 1900) (statement of Rep Ray).
177 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1946 (Feb 19,1900) (statement of Rep Payne).
175
176
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Representative Lane observed that this strategy to secure judicial review was proposed by several House members: "[I]t is suggested that
the tariff bill will furnish a means to raise the constitutional questions
and have the Supreme Court decide them within two years."
Finally, the presence of several members of Congress and the
administration when the Supreme Court announced its decisions provided further corroboration that the political branches welcomed or at
least accepted Supreme Court intervention. As the New York World
reported: "A momentous political and legal question hinged on the
decision. The administration watched the case eagerly."'" Press accounts revealed that Secretary Root, Attorney General Philander
Knox, Solicitor General John K. Richards, Senators Henry C. Lodge
and William E. Mason, and Representatives James D. Richardson and
Charles Grosvenor were present in the Supreme Court when the Insular Cases opinions were read aloud." And that the media widely reported the attendance of an array of elected officials at the announcement of the decisions may have had the broader effect of signaling political leaders' acceptance of the Court's decisions."'
C. Endorsing the Validity of Judicial Intervention
Members of Congress also appeared specifically to endorse judicial resolution of the hotly contested issue of American expansionism.
Contained in a variety of statements by party leaders and rank-andfile legislators were (1) seemingly hopeful anticipation that the Supreme Court would intervene, and (2) express acknowledgment of the
legitimacy and supremacy of the Court's decision with respect to unincorporated territories.n

56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3716 (Apr 3,1900) (statement of Rep Lane).
ConstitutionFollows Flag: Porto Rico Tariff Legal, NY World at 1 (cited in note 150).
180 See The Status of Our InsularPossessions,WashPost 1 (May 28,1901) (detailing the frenzy on
the day the decisions were handed down and cataloging politicians that were in attendance).
181See Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 86 (cited in note 1).
182 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3672 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Sen Mason) ("What can we say to the laboring men if this revenue tariff goes through, even
though the Supreme Court should sustain it?"); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1954
(Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Dalzell):
Now, no constitutional amendment was made, not because Mr. Jefferson, as my friend from
Tennessee [Mr. Richardson] said, came to the conclusion that none was necessary, but because it was held by statesmen, as it was subsequently held by the court, that the United
States was a sovereign nation, having and entitled to exercise all the powers of any sovereign nation ... and as a necessary consequence of that right, the right to govern it without
limitation, save that in the discretion of the Congress, its agents in the government.
178

179
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Representative Robert Morris, for starters, shared his view that
the issue of territorial governance would necessarily and inevitably
come before the Court: "[I]t is necessary for us (and the Supreme
Court will find it necessary) to come to a clear and fixed determination of the meaning of the term 'United States' as used in the Constitution."'. Congressman David A. De Armond, while less deterministic
about the matter, nevertheless also predicted that the Court would
soon intervene:
I believe the time is not far off-and I am warranted in that belief by reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court, by everything that we have upon that subject that deserves the name of
authority ... that the time is not far off when the doctrine ... [will

be affirmed] that the Constitution is not merely a convenient little thing like a garment, to be taken off and put on.'
Senator William Mason was not only convinced that the Court would,
in fact, intervene but also expressed confidence that the justices would
discharge their duty unaffected by the powerful political currents that
had swept up most legislators:
Do you think that the fever of imperial expansion has so overtaken the people that we will abandon the doctrine of American
protection that we may put the flag over an unwilling and an unhappy people; or do you dream that the Supreme Court is so
tainted with partisanship that it will descend from its upper atmosphere of a pure jurisprudence to carry out the dictates of a
party caucus?8
Representative Littlefield agreed that the Court would resolve the
debate as a principled arbiter in a manner insulated from the tug-ofwar of public opinion:
Such are a few of the considerations tending to show that the
profession and the country may not feel like unreservedly ac56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1946 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Payne) ("[N]o citizen
of the United States, feeling aggrieved by these alleged imperial laws, has [yet] gone into the
United States court .... This uniform interpretation of the Constitution by Congress has not
been questioned by any citizen of the United States in any court.").
183 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1577 (Feb 6, 1900) (statement of Rep Morris).
184 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3751 (Apr 4, 1900) (statement of Rep De Armond).
185 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3671 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Mason). See
also 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3669 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Mason) ("[I]t is a
question whether you can pass a bill by the United States Congress that will stand the test of the
Supreme Court revision that it contains with it the inherent force and right to take a man's life
without due process of law.").
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quiescing in this decision. The foundation upon which it rests is
too insecure to insure permanence. As the needle always turns to
the pole, may we not hope that the greatest court in Christendom
will in the end determine the law of the land in accordance with
correctprinciples.

Because these statements reflected the political branches' conscious
aim of entrusting the Court to settle the controversy over American
expansionism, they facilitated and diminished concerns about judicial
resolution of a political question.
These political overtures enabled judicial review by signaling that
Congress and the President actually preferred that the Court settle
the hotly contested dispute over American expansion; this was a message that members of the Court received. Justice McKenna explicitly
noted these political entreaties in explaining the Court's willingness to
adjudicate the Insular Cases: "If the other departments of the government must look to the judicial for light, that light should burn steadily."'V Justice Harlan wrote in a private communication: "Our next
term is likely to be a most important one; chiefly because we may be
called on to declare the extent of the power of Congress, over our new
possessions. I hear there is a case on the docket which will compel us
to face the issue."88
Finally, even before the start of the Spanish-American War, the
Democratic Party had declared its recognition of judicial supremacy
on issues of territorial governance. Admitting "differences of opinion"
about the limits on the power of Congress to govern the territories,
the platform declared: "Resolved, That the Democratic party will abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon
these questions of Constitutional Law."'" The platform went even fur-

186 Charles E. Littlefield, The Insular Cases II,15 Harv
187 De Lima, 182 US at 205 (McKenna dissenting).

L Rev 281,297 (1901) (emphasis added).

188 Sparrow, Emergence of American Empire at 79 (cited in note 1). Harlan's letter continued: "It is a great question, and worthy of serious, deliberate consideration. I have impressions,
but no fixed opinions." Loren P. Beth, John Marshall Harlan:The Last Whig Justice 250 (Kentucky 1992).
189

Democratic

Party

Platform; June

18,

1860,

Avalon

Project,

online

at

http://avalon.aw.yale.edu1l9thcentury/deml860.asp (visited Jan 29, 2010). Presumably this did
not refer to all constitutional questions. In fact, the party had simultaneously decided to distinguish explicitly among different issues of constitutional law: "Inasmuch as difference of opinion
exists in the Democratic party as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the United States,
over the institution of slavery within the Territories." Id. See also Littlefield, 15 Harv L Rev at
184 (cited in note 103).
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ther and advised its citizenry to also respect Court decisions concerning territorial governance:
Resolved, That it is in accordance with the true interpretation of
the Cincinnati platform that, during the existence of the territorial governments, the measure of restriction, whatever it may be,
imposed by the Federal Constitution on the power of the territorial legislature over the subject of the domestic relations, as the
same has been, or shall hereafter be finally determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States, should be respected by all
good citizens, and enforced with promptness and fidelity by every
branch of the General Government.*
Thus, politicians' explicit invitation and implicit endorsement of
judicial intervention essentially certified the political question to the
Court, requesting that the judiciary verify one view of the Constitution or the other.
D. Casting the Political Issue in Legal and Constitutional Terms
Politicians also tacitly courted judicial intervention by debating
expansionism in explicitly legal terms. Even though leaders recognized
the important political considerations implicated by expansionism,9
politicians chose routinely and repeatedly to frame the controversy in
legal terms. As Judge Cabranes once remarked: "Not since Dred Scott
and the struggle over slavery had the country been so racked by a political controversy framed in constitutional terms. Once again, the constitutional theories elaborated by scholars and argued by political
leaders revealed fundamental disagreements about how the nation
ought to define itself."'" The various formulations of the foreign policy
debate-what authority the United States had to acquire territories,
whether these islands were domestic or foreign, and what rights
should be accorded to residents of these territories -were all cast as
constitutional questions. Political leaders relied heavily on the text of

190 Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United States of America during the
Period of Reconstruction 362 (Philp & Solomons 1871).
191 See, for example, The "Deadly Parallel" on Cuban Tariff Reduction, S Rep No 439, 57th

Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1902) (noting the views of the economic interests of the secretary of war and
governor general on tariffs with respect to the islands); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3671
(Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Teller) (Apr 3, 1900) (asserting the foreign diplomatic concerns
with saying one thing to Europe and saying another to Puerto Rico).
192 See Cabranes, 100 Harv L Rev at 455 (cited in note 82).
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the Constitution and earlier Supreme Court decisions during these
debates over American expansionism.
First, what authority the United States had to acquire territories
was debated on the basis of what the Constitution permitted. For example, in proposing a resolution on December 6, 1898, Senator George
Vest argued that a colonial model was flatly incompatible with the
structure of government contemplated and established by the Framers,
and that the United States Constitution simply did not authorize the
federal government to maintain territories with no path to statehood:
[U]nder the Constitution of the United States no power is given
to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and
governed permanently as colonies. The colonial system of European nations can not be established under our present Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government ... must be

acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing
such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union."
Likewise, Congressman De Armond said, "[T]he controversy must be
settled by appealing to the Constitution, by getting the correct decision from the words of the Constitution.... The Constitution is the
fountain head,"' just as Judge Charles A. Gardiner described it as a
193 Public debates in newspapers and elsewhere reflected a similar dialogue. See, for example, Edmunds, 537 N Am Rev at 150-51 (cited in note 145) ("Congress, thinking itself free from
any constitutional constraint, has thought it fit to enact discriminative measures affecting intrinsic rights and interests ... has imposed conditions upon the people of Cuba not hinted at in the
solemn, public declaration made by Congress, when the great drama out of which have grown all
our present embarrassments opened."). Similarly, the New York Evening Postexcerpted a speech
given by George G. Mercer of the American League of Philadelphia:
On this anniversary of the birth of Washington we bid you welcome to the city where he
presided over the deliberations of the convention which framed our Constitution. Here,
where he lived while President of the United States we are glad to have you come to measure by his standard the acts of the President today. Here, where Jefferson wrote, and our
Revolutionary forefathers adopted, the Declaration "that these colonies are and of right
out to be free and independent," we trust that you may demand for the Philippines the
same rights of freedom and self-government.... Here, where the Constitution had its birth,
we beg you to consider whether the interpretation of that Constitution as made by John
Marshall shall be the supreme law of the land, or whether it shall be interpreted by William
McKinley in such a way as to establish extra-continental and imperial government over territory belonging to the United States.
See Tompkins, 36 Pac Hist Rev at 149 (cited in note 109), quoting Speech of George G. Mercer,
Eastern Conference of Anti-Imperialists (Feb 23, 1900), in Special Anti-Imperialist Supplement,
NY Evening Post 2 (Feb 24,1900).
194 55 Cong, 3d Sess, in 32 Cong Rec S 20 (Dec 6,1898) (statement of Sen Vest).
195 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3750 (Apr 4, 1900) (statement of Rep De Armond)
(reasoning by analogy that if the Constitution is the fountain head, then Congress is one of the
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"constitutional" quandary in a speech at President McKinley's reelection headquarters: "The Republican Party maintains that the United
States has the right to acquire the Philippines or other foreign territory. The Democratic Party denies such right. A Constitutional problem
fundamental to expansion is thus put at issue and made a vital part of
the campaign.""6
Second, politicians consistently argued that the islands were domestic or foreign on the basis of whether they fell within the constitutional terms "territories" or "the United States."" The congressional
record is filled with quotes from the floor of both the House and Senate citing the constitutional text as determinative of whether the island territories should be considered separate from the United
States.'" Thus, Representative John Dalzell said:
Does the term "United States" include Puerto Rico as the framers of that instrument intended when they used that language?
The first place that we ought to go for an answer to that question
is to the Constitution itself. We ought to be able to ascertain from
the language used what was the intention of the framers of that
great instrument at the time when it was made."
Representative Ray asserted even more forcefully that the Constitution was not simply an initial starting point but rather provided a conclusive answer:
I can answer it to my own satisfaction completely, and I can answer it, I think, to the satisfaction of every fair-minded man within the authority and express language of the decisions of the Su-

streams flowing from it, and if a stream cannot rise higher than its source, then Congress is
bound by the Constitution and its words).
196 Charles A. Gardiner, The Policy of Expansion, NY Times 6 (Sept 23, 1900) (replying to
William Jennings Bryan). See John Gorham Palfrey, The Growth of the Idea of Annexation, and
Its Breaking upon ConstitutionalLaw: A Study among the Records of Congress, 13 Harv L Rev

371, 394 (1899) (noting that Senators Morrell, Hoar, Lodge, and Platt resisted American annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines by lodging "constitutionalobjections" to these acquisitions) (emphasis added).
197 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.").
198 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3750 (Apr 4, 1900) (statement of
Rep De Armond).
199 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1953 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Dalzell).
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preme Court of the United States and in such a way that no lawyer or man capable of comprehending legal reasoning [sic]."
Third, politicians framed the question of what rights to accord to
the newly acquired territories -an issue that, under the Treaty of Paris, was arguably left to Congress'-as a legal inquiry. The Democratic
national platform of 1900 maintained that the territories were entitled
to those rights accorded by the Constitution and therefore asked:
"Does the Constitution follow the flag?" Secretary of War Elihu
Root construed the issue similarly and answered this question in the
negative: "[A]s near as I can make out the Constitution follows the
flag-but doesn't quite catch up with it."2 Casting these different political questions as all answered by the Constitution made intervention
by the Supreme Court seem not only appropriate but essential.
Having framed these foreign policy questions as constitutional issues, political leaders further legitimized judicial intervention by relying on modes of classic legal reasoning in debating territorial governance. Rather than acting as independent interpreters relying on political considerations such as expediency or popular will, political leaders
primarily made legal arguments based on (1) doctrinal precedents
established by the Supreme Court, and (2) the Framers' intent and the
"spirit" of the Constitution.
First, rather than providing their own interpretive understandings
of the text of the Constitution, leaders relied primarily on those of the
Supreme Court.' The House majority report, for example, included a
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2037 (Feb 21, 1900) (statement of Rep Ray).
See note 122.
Donald Bruce Johnson, ed, 1 National Party Platforms 112 (Illinois 1978) (suggesting
that were the Constitution not to follow the flag the United States would become "half republic
and half empire").
203 Fiss, 8 Troubled Beginnings at 245 n 77 (cited in note 81).
204 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3750 (Apr 4, 1900) (statement of
Rep De Armond) (noting that it is instructive to consider "the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States interpreting the Constitution ... [w]hen a dispute arises as to whether Congress has or has not any particular power"); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3691 (Apr 3,
1900) (statement of Sen Gallinger) (quoting Justice Bradley's arguments in different Supreme
Court opinions); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec 3670-71 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen
Mason) (including Capital Traction Company v Hof, 174 US 1, 45-46 (1899) (holding that Congress would have power from the Constitution to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, but that power is limited by the Constitution) and McAllister v UnitedStates, 141 US 174,
181 (1891) (holding that the Supreme Court was created "in virtue of that clause which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the
United States")); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3564 (Mar 31, 1900) (statement of Sen
Fairbanks) ("In fact, it has been discussed more or less since the Louisiana purchase, almost a
century ago. It is impossible to recall a precedent or authority which has not been invoked in
200

201
202
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lengthy discussion of Supreme Court precedents in elaborating its
position.m Representative John Dalzell, in a quote characteristic of
those invoking the Constitution, argued for unconstrained imperialism
on the basis of Supreme Court case law: "I say, then, that not only
from the four corners of the Constitution itself, but from the decisions
of the highest court of the land, we are led to believe that the term
'United States' in the Constitution does not extend to and cover the
Territories.,,. By citing the holdings and opinions of the Court in this
way, elected officials endorsed judicial authority to decide political
issues arising from American expansionism.'
Second, to the extent that politicians engaged in an inquiry separate from the Court, they relied heavily on traditional forms of legal
analysis (for example, textualism, legislative history, the intent of the
Framers) to complement political arguments: m "We ought to be able
support of one or the other contention and with which the country and the Senate have not
already become entirely familiar."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2004 (Feb 20, 1900)
(statement of Rep Hopkins) ("I have carefully studied each of these decisions, and I think when
they are properly considered they are in harmony with the position I assume."); 56 Cong, 1st
Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2003 (Feb 20,1900) (statement of Rep Hopkins):
I think, [Mr. Chairman], that a careful analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States will support my contention that the ceded islands become the property of,
and not an integral part of, the United States. In support of that position, I desire to briefly
call the attention of members of the House to what Mr. Justice Bradley said in the case of
Mormon Church v.United States.
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1968-69 (Feb 20, 1900) (statement of Rep Kenney) ("That
title and possession has passed to us is beyond dispute, and with title and possession to us the
Constitution has gone to them."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1953-54 (Feb 19, 1900)
(statement of Rep Dalzell) (engaging in a lengthy discussion of five Supreme Court cases); 56
Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1949-50 (Feb 19,1900) (statement of Rep Richardson) ("I shall
cite decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which in my judgment are absolutely
decisive of this question."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1948 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement
of Rep Richardson) ("This is a tax measure. The power to tax is the power to destroy. This is the
language of the Supreme Court.").
205 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1945 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Payne) ("The
cases which bear out our contention, some of them directly and others indirectly, are cited in the majority report. I will add a reference to but a single case. That of Endleman et al. vs. United States").
206 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1954 (Feb 19,1900) (statement of Rep Dalzell).
207 For example, Senator Teller explained: "You must amend the Constitution to levy this
tariff and pass this bill, or you must get the Supreme Courtof the United States to stultify itself and
reverse its decisions." 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3671 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen
Teller) (emphasis added). See also 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2037 (Feb 21, 1900)
(statement of Rep Ray).
208 Interestingly, even when Congress was debating the Treaty of Guadalupe and the annexation of Mexico, Representative Stephens denounced what he described as a war of conquest as
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. See Cong Globe App, 30th Cong, 2d Sess 146 (Feb 17,
1849) (statement of Rep Stephens) ("We have seen an Executive, in open disregard of the Constitution, and in palpable violation of its plain letter, make war with a neighboring country.").
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to ascertain [the intention of the Framers] from the language used."
Representative Henry Boutell, for his part, observed that Jefferson
had first doubted the constitutional right to acquire Louisiana.2 o Senator Mason added that the Constitution mandated that "when you levy
an impost duty, that duty which the fathers were afraid of, that duty
which they went to war about, that duty which invited the Boston tea
party-it says when you levy that sort of a duty you must make it uniform throughout the United States."211
Thus, although the administration and Congress could have retained exclusive power to settle the status of the territories, the political branches facilitated judicial intervention by recasting American
foreign policy toward the newly acquired islands-an area historically
understood as quintessentially political-as a constitutional matter
validly refereed by the Court.
E. Proposing Nonlegal Factors to Compensate for the Absence of
Traditional Judicial Standards
Of course, aside from typical forms of legal reasoning, political
leaders raised nonlegal arguments for and against American expansionism.21 Various nonlegal considerations figured prominently in the
209 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1953-54 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Dalzell)
(considering the Framers' intent in the context of determining the definition of the "United
States"). See also Cong Globe App, 30th Cong, 2d Sess 145 (Feb 27, 1849) (statement of Rep
Stephens); Palfrey, 13 Harv L Rev at 371-72 (cited in note 196).
210 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1948 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Richardson)
(noting that Representative Boutell from Illinois had reported that "Mr. Jefferson[] at first
doubted the constitutional right to acquire the Louisiana territory. But this doubt was soon
dispelled, and all agreed that an amendment was unnecessary.").
211 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3669 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Mason). Senator George Hoar also invoked this originalist mode of argument when he said, "that Washington
lived and that Lincoln died only that we might have another Rome or another Spain; that Spain
has so revenged herself upon us as that her spirit and ideals have entered into and taken possession of us-these things shall never happen while America is America, and while Massachusetts
is Massachusetts." Senator Hoar'sViews, 55 Friends' Intelligencer at 831 (cited in note 161).
212 The Republican Party platform of 1900 declared, for example, that "[t]he largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by

law." See John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds, The American Presidency Project:Republican

Party Platform of 1900 (University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009), online at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29630 (visited Jan 29,2010).
213 Secretary of War Root stated in his annual report, which was cited in the Congressional
Record: "The highest considerations of justice and good faith demand that we should not disappoint the confident expectation of sharing in our prosperity with which the people of Porto Rico
so gladly transferred their allegiance to the United States." 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S
3672 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Mason) (reading aloud quotes from particular individuals
regarding the tariff rate imposed on Puerto Rico). Likewise, Representative Culberson urged
that the custom duties be removed: "In my judgment these duties are indefensible upon moral,
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political and public debate over American expansionism, including
foreign opinion,214 racist rhetoric,' and the commercial needs of the
216
economy. And to the extent politicians deemed these arguments relevant, they explicitly instructed the Supreme Court to consider these
nonlegal considerations in making its legal decisions. For example, Solicitor General John K. Richards seemed uncharacteristically political in
his argument before the Supreme Court:
[T]he acquisition of these territories, situated in distant tropical
seas, and inhabited by alien races, savage or semi-civilized, strangers to our system of law and mode of government, with the accompanying obligation of so governing them so as to secure and
preserve peace and order and protect life and property, has

brought us face to face with problems.217
Members of Congress were equally explicit in proffering nonlegal factors to the Court. Political expediency was the predominant nonlegal
factor emphasized by leaders. For example, in a letter to Justice Harlan, Philippine Governor William Howard Taft stressed that the Supreme Court should weigh the prudential consequences of a ruling.
Taft wrote that if the Supreme Court found the territories to be domestic and thereby deemed the tariffs on trade unconstitutional, this
would "result in a very narrow colonial policy for the islands."21 Taft
economic, and constitutional grounds." 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3677 (Apr 3, 1900)
(statement of Rep Culberson). See also 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3673 (Apr 3, 1900)
(statement of Sen Mason) ("For if Congress has not a free hand to deal with these islands as
their different conditions and changing needs demand, it is not only inexpedient but it may be
impossible to hold them."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3690 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Sen Wellington) ("I believe more income will be realized by the extension of the American
impost duties and internal revenue than by the imposition of this illegal and unjustifiable 15 per
cent duty."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3692-93 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of Sen Lindsay) (quoting a professor who studied taxation on the island territories).
214 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3671 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Sen Teller) (stressing the foreign diplomatic problems with making contradictory comments to
Europe and Puerto Rico).
215 See, for example, Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 63 (cited in note 1) (noting
that the Democratic platform declared that "Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering
our civilization").
216 See, for example, 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 3721 (Apr 3, 1900) (statement of
Rep Lane) ("Are we to sacrifice the principles of the Declaration of Independence to sell a few
bales of cotton or a few bushels of wheat? Trade is valuable; but, purchased by the sacrifice of
the principles of the Declaration of Independence and of the Farewell Address of Washington
and of the Monroe doctrine, it is not worth the price."); S Rep No 439 at 3 (cited in note 191).
217 Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 60 (cited in note 1).
218 Linda Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan 138 (UNC 1999)
(detailing Taft's letter to Justice Harlan). Other representatives also took positions on territorial
governance on the basis of its impact on the country. Representative Richardson maintained that
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therefore requested of the Court: "If there is room for two constructions [ ] take the one that avoids such a result."219
Representative Albert J. Hopkins highlighted other nonlegal variables for the Court to consider in deciding the cases:
We are confronted in this legislation with the acquisition of territory under different terms from any previous acquisition in the history of the Republic. The location of the islands, climatic conditions, the inhabitants themselves and their known incapacity at the
present time for self-government will all have a powerful influence
with the court in determining the constitutionality of our action.=
Finally, Senator Teller sought to cast prior practice as a source of
precedent: "I ask, in the name of common sense, if the practice of a
century of this Government is not a fair interpretation of law."...
Such political direction addressed a central weakness in the legal
determination of a political question-the lack of judicially determinable standards. Instructions given by the political branches seemingly
authorized the Supreme Court to weigh political (that is, nonlegal)
factors. Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that
such considerations dominated the Court's decisions.m
Justice White, for example, apparently explained that significant
to his votes was the political fear that a contrary ruling in Downes
would have created a precedent that constrained Congress's governance of the Philippines:

the country was able to grow and acquire even when acting in accordance with Constitution. See
56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1947 (Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Richardson) ("The
Louisiana territory, Florida, Texas, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Alaska have all been
acquired under our Constitution without a jar or strain to any of its wise and beneficent provisions and without any demand for its amendment.").
219 Sparrow, Emergence ofAmerican Empire at 78 (cited in note 1).
220 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2005 (Feb 20, 1900) (statement of Rep Hopkins).
221 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3670 (Apr 3,1900) (statement of Sen Mason) (noting
that the United States had never imposed an "impost duty between the United States and the
newly acquired territory").
222 See, for example, Rowe, 18 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 41 (cited in note 101):
In comparing the majority and minority opinions the most striking difference is in the relative importance given to the factor of "expediency." The majority opinion adopts certain
hard and fast rules of interpretation, and shows an evident disinclination to give any weight
to the inconvenience which might result to the political organs of the government because
of such interpretation. The minority opinion, on the other hand, contains a broad treatment
of the relation between the different departments of the government, and it is easy to
detect a settled determination to leave to Congress and the Executive a free hand in dealing with our new possessions.
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[I]n a conversation subsequent to the decision [Justice White] told
me of his dread lest by a ruling of the Court it might have become
impossible to dispose of the Philippine Islands .... It was evident

that he was much preoccupied by the danger of racial and social
questions of a very perplexing character and that he was quite as
desirous as Mr. Justice Brown that Congress should have a very
free hand in dealing with the new subject populations.2
Even Justice Brown, who believed that the cases were fit for judicial
review, acknowledged the close proximity between the questions before the Court and classic political questions: "We can only consider
this aspect of the case so far as to say that no construction of the Constitution should be adopted which would prevent Congress from considering each case upon its merits, unless the language of the instrument imperatively demand it."24 Justice Brown went on to say that
Congress "may do for the Territories what the people, under the Constitution of the United States, may do for the States," adding that the
authority arose "not necessarily from the territorial clause of the Constitution, but from the necessities of the case." The dissenting justices
in Downes reasoned that "these arguments are merely political, and
'political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules of
judicial interpretation."',, That view, of course, did not carry the day.

223 Terrasa, 31 John Marshall L Rev at 79 (cited in note 75), citing Coudert, 26 Colum L Rev at
832 (cited in note 81). See also De Lima, 182 US at 218 (McKenna dissenting):
That principle [that all laws apply] is asserted by counsel, and is very simple, but, applied as
counsel apply it, is fraught with grave consequences. It takes this great country out of the
world and shuts it up within itself It binds and cripples the power to make war and peace. It
may take away the fruits of victory, and, if we may contemplate the possibility of disaster, it
may take away the means of mitigating that. All those great and necessary powers, are, as a
consequence of the argument, limited by the necessity to make some impost or excise "uniform throughout the United States."
224 Downes, 182 US at 286.
225 De Lima, 182 US at 196 (emphasis added).
226 See Downes, 182 US at 374-75 (Fuller dissenting):
Briefs have been presented at this bar, purporting to be on behalf of certain industries, and
eloquently setting forth the desirability that our government should possess the power to impose a tariff on the products of newly acquired territories so as to diminish or remove competition. That however, furnishes no basis for judicial judgment, and if the producers of staples in
the existing States of this Union believe the Constitution should be amended so as to reach
that result, the instrument itself provides how such amendment can be accomplished.
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IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR POLITICAL REINFORCEMENT OF
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY

The prior Part argued that in the years leading to the InsularCases, the political branches essentially consented to judicial adjudication
of issues that otherwise would have fallen to them to decide. But the
"consent and certify" theory is not meant only as a descriptive explanation of the events preceding the Court's consideration of the Insular
Cases. Those cases can also be understood as an illustration of a valid
and defensible process of institutional dialogue between the political
branches and the judiciary, a process that can sometimes authorize
and validate the final settlement by the Supreme Court of even the
most bitter national disputes. This Part offers three arguments to rationalize this process.
A. Diminished Justification of Doctrinal Bar
First, in "consent and certify" cases, that is, where the political
branches have affirmatively certified a political question to the courts,
the traditional doctrinal justification for prohibiting judicial review is
somewhat weaker. In Baker v Carr,M the Supreme Court identified six
factors to use to test the existence of a political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.m
The criteria set forth in Baker can be restated as reflecting three sets
of concerns that animate modern political question doctrine: (1) referring a textually committed task to a different branch of government
upsets the proper allocation of constitutional authority; (2) the judiciary lacks the standards and judgment to resolve issues that fall outside its institutional competence; and (3) conflicting or competing
227
228

369 US 186 (1962).
Id at 217.
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pronouncements risk embarrassment (or worse) and undermine principles of comity. So how does the proposed "consent and certify"
process account for these problems? The remainder of this Article
argues that these difficulties are not present or are significantly attenuated in cases where the political branches have themselves invited
and facilitated judicial review.
1. Proper allocation of authority.
To be sure, the consent and certify process does the least, on its
face, to address the concerns implicated by the first Baker criterion.
After all, where the text of the Constitution has assigned responsibility over an issue to a specific political branch of government, why
should that branch's efforts to transfer responsibility be significant?
Why is it relevant that the political branches have consented to judicial review or sought to certify the question if the Constitution allocates authority to a political actor? The force of these questions,
though, assumes that the political branches have been vested by the
Constitution with exclusive (rather than primary) jurisdiction with
respect to a particular issue 2 It is true that, in some contexts, the text
of the Constitution will indicate that a political branch has exclusive,
nondelegable authority to decide a question. For example, Article I of
the Constitution states that the House of Representatives "shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment," and that the Senate "shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments."21 In most other contexts, however, the political branches may be thought to have primary responsibility-but not exclusive, nondelegable authority-to address an issue.
Consider, for example, the Constitution's instruction in Article III that
"Congress shall have [the] Power to declare the Punishment of Treason."232 If an individual were convicted pursuant to the Treason Clauses, but objected to the penalty imposed by Congress on the ground
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, would a federal
229 The distinction between exclusive and primary jurisdiction has found some currency in
the administrative law context. See, for example, Ricci v Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 US
289, 302-06 (1973) (discussing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction). Although I do not mean to
invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in any real sense, it is an instructive analogy. In Ricci,
the Supreme Court described the notion of primary jurisdiction in this way: "It has been argued
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involves a mere postponement, rather than relinquishment of judicial jurisdiction." Id at 320 (Marshall dissenting), citing Kenneth Culp Davis, 3 Ad-

ministrative Law Treatise § 19.01 at 3-4 (West 1958).
2o
231
232

US Const Art I, § 2, cl 5 (emphasis added).
US Const Art I § 3, cl 6 (emphasis added).
US Const Art III, § 3, cl 2.
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court be barred from considering the matter because the Constitution
had assigned to Congress the task of declaring the punishment for
treason?23 Presumably, the fact that Congress has primary authority to
set punishment does not categorically foreclose judicial review of constitutional issues raised by the legislature's corresponding action. Similarly, in the context of the Insular Cases, Article IV authorized Congress "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States";m but that does not mean that the Supreme Court was prohibited under all circumstances from determining whether congressional
legislation violated a provision of the Constitution -for example, the
Uniformity Clause. Thus, at the very least, courts should be able to
adjudicate issues over which the political branches only have primary,
but not exclusive, authority.
In that case, however, shouldn't the question of whether Congress
has exclusive or primary jurisdiction dictate whether political question
doctrine precludes judicial review? In other words, if the Constitution
grants Congress exclusive authority, then perhaps the judiciary cannot
intercede; if the Constitution does not confer exclusive authority, then
a court is not prevented from addressing the issue. What does it matter
that the political branches have engaged in the "consent and certify"
process described in Part III? But this oversimplifies matters for at
least two reasons.
First, as Justice Jackson explained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co v Sawyer, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.".. Justice Jackson therefore concluded in the Youngstown case that
the authority of the executive branch of government to act depended
on whether it was consistent with how the legislative branch desired to
proceed: "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." The
dynamic between Congress and the (unelected) Court is obviously
233 To be clear, I am not pressing the substantive argument that Congress only has nonexclusive authority over the punishment for treason, or that a court is definitely entitled to review
whether a specific punishment is constitutionally excessive. I only mean to suggest that some
such examples exist under the Constitution where the textual commitment of a duty is presumptive, but not exclusive.
2
US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2.
235 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring).
236 Id.
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different than the relationship between two political branches; still,
Justice Jackson's view that "practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government" carries at least some force with respect to the Supreme Court and the political branches, to whose
judgments the courts routinely defer in the spirit of sustaining Justice
Jackson's workable government.m
Second, legislators' appeals to the courts are significant because,
where the political branches have publicly wrestled with the issue and
where elected representatives are on record as to their views, the "democratic" risks of the political branches ducking an issue are diminished.
Put another way, the fact that Congress is allowed to transfer its assigned task to another branch of government does not mean that it is
always proper to do so. The nondelegation principle established in administrative law is commonly justified by reference to the temptation of
elected officials to avoid deciding politically vexing questions!" Although the "consent and certify" process does not guarantee that political actors will be compelled to take a position and be held accountable
for their views, a vigorous public debate in advance of certification ensures that some of the advantages and safeguards of public discourse
are preserved even if the judiciary settles the issue in the end.
2. Institutional competence.
The second and third Baker factors are seemingly concerned with
judicial competence. Thus, the political question doctrine reflects the
view that, without judicially "manageable standards" and faced with
policy judgments "clearly" meant "for nonjudicial discretion," a court
should not be entrusted to resolve the matter.240 But this problem may
be mitigated when substitute standards have been supplied by the
political branches. As the Insular Cases illustrate, the political
branches may, over the course of the "consent and certify" process,
237 But see Rosen, Atlantic Monthly at 57 (cited in note 84) ("Throughout American history, the Supreme Court, often derided as the least democratic branch of the federal government,
has, paradoxically, best maintained its legitimacy when it has functioned as the most democratic
branch-that is, when it has deferred to the constitutional views of Congress, the president, and
the country as a whole.").
238 See, for example, Chevron US.A. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837,844 (1984) (formulating the
principle of deferring to administrative agencies in interpretations of federal statutes for which
the agency is responsible); Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School DistrictNo 1,
551 US 701, 866 (2007) (Breyer dissenting) (urging "respect for democratic local decisionmaking
by States and school boards").
2
See, for example, Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,67 U Chi L Rev 315, 323 (2000);
Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The StruggleforAuto Safety 232-33 (Harvard 1990).
2 Baker, 369 US at 217.
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supply a variety of alternate standards for a court's consideration."
Some of these factors (for example, "climactic conditions") will be
foreign to the judiciary; other standards, even though they are not
classically legal (for example, the impact on the economy, the capacity
for self-government), nonetheless resemble the types of considerations that courts commonly examine in rendering decisions.
It is worth acknowledging that this proposition assumes that the
existence or nonexistence of viable standards is not a fixed, unchangeable condition-that is, it assumes that judicial standards can be developed, or may emerge over time, even if they were not present at
first. This assumption is consistent with the views of several members
of the current Supreme Court, at least based upon the efforts of multiple justices to craft judicial standards in the last political gerrymandering case, Vieth v Jubelirer.A' Although the Court ultimately concluded in Vieth that the matter was not justiciable, Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion made it clear that even he believed that judicially
manageable standards could be fashioned or found in the future even
though they were not apparent at the time: "That no such standard has
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will
emerge in the future."2"
3. Competing pronouncements.
The remaining three prongs of the Baker test concern the symbolic and tangible problems created by the judiciary meddling with
legislative affairs. None of these concerns are seriously implicated,
however, when the legislature has itself solicited the courts to intervene. First, the political branches can hardly feel that their authority
has been usurped by the courts, or that the courts have failed to show
See Part Ill.
See, for example, Department of Transportation v Public Citizen, 541 US 752, 771-73
(2004) (assessing the environmental effects of a new program); Citizens Bank v Alafabco, Inc,
539 US 52,57-58 (2003) (considering the impact on the national economy); Santa ClaraPueblo v
Martinez, 436 US 49, 59--60 (1978) (considering how a particular statutory interpretation would
affect Indian tribes' ability to self-govern).
243 541 US 267 (2004). See id at 347-51 (Souter dissenting) (proposing a judicial standard with
five elements to establish a political gerrymandering claim); id at 365 (Breyer dissenting) ("[Courts
can identify a number of strong indicia of abuse. The presence of actual entrenchment, while not
always unjustified (being perhaps a chance occurrence), is such a sign, particularly when accompanied by the use of partisan boundary-drawing criteria."); id at 336 (Stevens dissenting) ("The racial
gerrymandering cases therefore supply a judicially manageable standard for determining when
partisanship, like race, has played too great of a role in the districting process.").
244 See id at 311 (Kennedy concurring) (suggesting that First Amendment principles could
supply judicially manageable standards where principles of equal protection had failed).
241
242
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them "the respect due [a] coordinate branch[] of government" in situations where the court is answering an explicit invitation by the legislature to mediate a debate. Moreover, in cases where the legislature
has not issued a decision on the question in dispute, there is neither
"an unusual need for unquestioning adherence" nor is there any risk
of "embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements." Thus, in contexts such as the Insular Cases, this last set of concerns does not justify
the unbending application of the political question doctrine.
For these reasons, the structural, symbolic, and practical considerations underlying modern political question doctrine, as formulated in
Baker, are at their weakest where political actors have purposefully
consented to judicial review.
B.

Political Stewardship of the Constitution

Second, separate from the doctrinal arguments supporting a
"consent and certify" procedure, this dialogic process supports a
broader theory of the shared responsibility of both the judiciary and
political branches to interpret and abide by the Constitution.2 s Scho-

larship that defends the affirmative role of the political branches in
applying the Constitution is especially salient in the context of the
Insular Cases. In fact, just before those cases were heard, elected officials debated the legality of American expansionism in expressly constitutional terms' Some, like Senator Mason, premised his entire view
245 See, for example, Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes:A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice108 (Yale 2004) (identifying instances "of partnership between the Supreme Court and Congress in the enterprise of securing constitutional justice"); Keith E. Whit-

tington, ConstitutionalConstruction:Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 207-28 (Har-

vard 1999) (advocating that the Constitution exists in the political realm-binding policymakers
even as they are crafting government policy-as well as in the judicial realm); David A. Strauss,
Presidential Interpretationof the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L Rev 113, 113 (1993) ("Every day,

officers or employees in the executive branch must interpret the Constitution."). At the time of
the InsularCases, and even today, legislators regularly submit their views as to how constitutional issues should be decided. Compare 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2680 (Mar 8, 1900)
(cataloging the views of legislators with respect to the proper disposition of the Insular Cases)
with Brief of United States Senator Arlen Specter as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Boumediene v Bush, Nos 06-1195, 06-1196, *27 (US filed Aug 24,2007) (available on Westlaw at
2007 WL 2441578) ("Specter Brief') ("By making clear that certain constitutional minimums
apply, this Court will preserve Congress' role in mapping out the path forward while simultaneously allowing the detainees the opportunity to be heard and to advance the merits of their
individual cases without further delay.").
246 There is widespread scholarly agreement that the political branches can and do interpret
the Constitution independent of the judiciary. See, for example, Susan R. Burgess, Contest for
ConstitutionalAuthority: The Abortion and War Powers Debates 109-26 (Kansas 1992) (denying

that any single interpreter is supreme); Mark Tishnet, Taking the Constitution away from the
Courts x-xi (Princeton 1999) (same); Neal Devins, Shaping ConstitutionalValues: Elected Gov-

2010]

The PoliticalRoots of JudicialLegitimacy

841

of expansionism on his obligation to protect and uphold the Constitution: "We took the oath at this desk to support this Constitution.... It
is the very sun of our political existence. It gives life and power to this
legislative body."... Others countered that those who favored expansionism did so at the expense of the Constitution: "The Republican
party is tired of the Federal Constitution, and desires to exploit our
new possessions without its restraints.,
One does not have to accept, however, the position that political
actors always, in all contexts, have a valuable perspective to provide as
independent arbiters of the Constitution. Nor is that broad proposition necessary to justify the "consent and certify" process. Rather, one
must only accept the narrower claim that the political branches have a
legitimate role to play in helping resolve what amounts to a constitutional boundary dispute. Political and judicial actors should be able to
validly submit their views at least as to where the elusive, constitutional line falls between political questions, on the one hand, and justiciable legal issues, on the other-that is, what matters have been exclusively assigned to the political branches and what issues are perhaps also the proper subject of judicial review."
ernment, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate 157-62 (Johns Hopkins 1996) (same);
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 231-74 (Princeton

1988) (same); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 27-37 (Princeton 1988) (studying "Protestant" forms of interpretation); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L J 217, 219-20 (1994) (examining the President
as a challenger to judicial supremacy); Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 Case W
Res L Rev 905, 905-06 (1990) (same); Walter F Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the
Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 Rev Polit 401, 413 (1986) (noting that "the American

system displays a general pattern of accepting the Court's constitutional interpretations" but
enumerating many ways in which other interpretations provide influence).
247 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 3669 (Apr 3,1900) (statement of Sen Mason).
248 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 2010 (Feb 20, 1900) (statement of Rep Swanson).
Admittedly, it is of course "next to impossible to ascertain whether these constitutional pronouncements [were] part of a forthright search for constitutional truth or, instead, whether the
Constitution [was] being used as a smoke-screen for overriding policy concerns." Devins, Shaping ConstitutionalValues at 123 (cited in note 246). But these statements suggest that legislators
believed it was valid for them to invoke the Constitution either to justify their position or to
attack their opponents.
249 Interestingly, emulating the traditional analytical approach of courts, political leaders
relied heavily on prior rulings by the Supreme Court in trying to decide for themselves the constitutionality of American expansionism. Congress could have exclusively argued that Article IV
of the Constitution and the Treaty of Paris gave it the power to govern the newly acquired territories as it saw fit. Instead, members of Congress argued on the basis of cases such as Callan v
Wilson, 127 US 540 (1888), American Publishing Co v Fischer,166 US 464 (1897), and American

Insurance Company v Canter, 28 US 307 (1830). See 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1958
(Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep DaIzell) ("In Callan vs. Wilson the point at issue was whether a
citizen of the District of Columbia was entitled to the provisions of the Constitution relating to
trial by jury. Held that he was."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1575 (Feb 6, 1900) (state-
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Cooperative Constitutional Interpretation

Finally, recognizing a "consent and certify" process could provide
a useful means by which to obtain the judiciary's view on a question
that the political branches have failed to settle. Some of the advantages of this coordinated approach can be gleaned from the analogous
practice of certifying legal questions from one court to another, which
is now common in federal and state courts.= As the Supreme Court
has said: "Certification procedure ... allows a federal court faced with

a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's
highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the
assurance of gaining an authoritative response."m' The practice of
summoning the state court to resolve uncertainty also obviates the
danger that the federal court will reach a result (or rely upon an assumption) that is contrary to the state court's view on a matter over
which it (the state court) has authority. A similar benefit is available if
elected officials are able to ask a court to mediate a longstanding, unsettled dispute that, despite its political dimensions, also raises legal
questions whose resolution would allow the legislative and executive
branches to move beyond the political disagreementn As the political
branches at the time of the Insular Cases seemingly believed, the delay, missed opportunities, and uncertainty produced by a deadlocked

ment of Rep Williams) ("In Callan vs. Wilson ... [the] court held that the [Fifth and Sixth
amendments] applied to the District of Columbia."); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1958
(Feb 19, 1900) (statement of Rep Dalzell) (using Fischer as evidence for his argument that the
Court approved of cases upholding constitutional rights for citizens of territories who were
granted such rights through treaty); 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec S 1931 (Feb 19, 1900)
(statement of Sen Foraker) ("I will read for just a moment from the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the American Insurance Company vs. Canter."). See also generally
Cross v Harrison,57 US 164 (1853), cited in 56 Cong, 1st Sess, in 33 Cong Rec H 1581 (Feb 6,
1900) (statement of Rep Morris) (distinguishing the holding in Cross-thatduties were lawfully
collected on foreign imports-by arguing it should be confined only to times of war).
250 See Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 520 US 43, 76 (1997) ("Most States have
adopted certification procedures."). See also Judith S.Kaye and Kenneth I.Weissman, Interactive
Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L Rev 373, 381-86 (2000)

(providing a history of the development of certification practices in the United States, with a
focus on New York). Though less common, the Supreme Court has itself also certified questions
to lower federal courts to clarify matters of state law. See, for example, Ayotte v PlannedParenthood of Northern New England,546 US 320, 331 (2006) ("Because this is an open question, we
remand for the lower courts to determine legislative intent in the first instance.").
251
252

Arizonans for Official English, 520 US at 76.

The "consent and certify" process is only meant as an exception to political question
doctrine; thus, it does not override other rules such as traditional standing requirements. Hence, a
court cannot issue an advisory opinion in order to assist the political branches in extricating
themselves from some form of political gridlock.
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legislature or a divided public may be more costly to both sides than a
final, authoritative answer to which all agree to submit.
One could object to this last justification for the "consent and certify" process on the ground that the Court's intervention in the Insular
Cases is emblematic of the purportedly flawed approach of the Lochner
era, and that endorsing judicial involvement in matters that fall anywhere outside the traditional purview of the courts only invites greater
activism. Judge Learned Hand, for one, claimed that Lochner revealed
the Court's establishment of a tricameral legislature where the courts
served as a "third camera with a final veto upon legislation with whose
economic or political expediency [the Court] totally disagrees.". In the
past, others have defended the alleged activisms of the Lochner Court
on various grounds, including precedent,m political necessity, or protection of individual liberty,5 disenfranchised groups,m and poorer
classes. The "consent and certify" process is not meant, of course, to
provide validation for the perceived "activism" of the early Lochner
Court in the Insular Cases. If anything, it is meant to distinguish the
Insular Cases from instances where the political branches did not facilitate and insist upon judicial review. After all, the main objection to
Lochner and its progeny was that the courts unilaterally arrogated
power to decide matters beyond their traditional jurisdiction. The
253 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv L Rev 495, 500
(1908). More recently, scholars have continued to criticize the Lochner era for allegedly violating
separation of powers principles. See, for example, Henry P.Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,

56 NYU L Rev 353, 382-83 (1981); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process:A FunctionalReconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 380-81 (Chicago 1980)

("[Tihe Court's exercise of review transgresses the division of national power decreed by the
Constitution and usurps functions delegated to Congress and the President.").
254

Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from Premodernismto Postmodernism

120 (Oxford 2000) ("[T]he Lochner Court had been guilty of judicial activism because it had
intruded into the institutional role of the legislature.").
255 See, for example, Charles W McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract"Reconsidered:
Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 S Ct Hist Socy Yearbook 20, 33

(concluding that Lochner was consistent with earlier lower court rulings).
256 See, for example, Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a
ConstitutionalRevolution 54-55 (Oxford 1998) (attributing activist case law to concern over the
scope of the states' police powers).
257 See, for example, Fiss, 8 Troubled Beginnings at 165 (cited in note 81) (justifying Lochner as
the Court's attempt to set boundaries for government regulation to protect individual liberty).
258 See, for example, David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans,
Labor Regulations and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal 3-7 (Duke 2001) (con-

cluding that Lochner may have aided African-Americans by invalidating labor laws that were
harming them specifically).
259 See Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract".Regime in American Law, in Harry
N. Scheiber, ed, The State and Freedom of Contract 161, 169-70 (Stanford 1998) (adopting the
view that Lochner was motivated by hostility to "class legislation").
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"consent and certify" process is meant, by contrast, to exalt a cooperative model of constitutional interpretation, one where the judiciary
addresses matters whose primary responsibility falls to the political
branches only where a broad spectrum of elected officials have invited
the courts to intervene.
In summary, this Article has argued (1) that a "consent and certify" process is consistent with the doctrinal justifications for political
question doctrine; (2) that the process recognizes the valid role political actors may play in interpreting what matters the Constitution forbids courts to decide; and (3) that it can facilitate, in some circumstances, a collaborative, restrained approach to constitutional analysis.
Thus, the events leading up to the Supreme Court's review of the Insular Cases do not only explain the Court's unusual intervention; they
also help to justify it. However much one might disagree with the
substantive outcome of the Court's rulings, its decision to consider and
resolve the dispute was valid, and it would be similarly proper for a
federal court to do the same thing today.
CONCLUSION

In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court was entrusted by the political branches with the task of deciding whether three newly acquired territories -Puerto

Rico, Guam, and the Philippines -were

foreign or domestic, and hence what authority the federal government
could exercise over these new acquisitions. Through its decisions, the
Court became an unexpected instrument of American expansionism.
At the same time, the Court also put to rest a simmering political debate that had divided the nation for years. This Article has argued that
the Court's intervention was neither a unilateral usurpation of power,
nor an illegitimate act that exceeded the Court's constitutional authority. Rather, the Insular Cases were the natural and justifiable consequence of a political mandate issued by the legislature and the public. This Article is therefore meant as an institutional and constitutional defense of the Court's role in the InsularCases.
But this conclusion, insofar as it suggests and endorses a process by
which a controversial Supreme Court decision can derive legitimacy and
enduring validity from the political branches, raises as many questions as
it answersm For one thing, what are the implications of this "consent and
260

Indeed, the debate over the proper role of Congress and the Court is hardly put to rest

by the consent and certify theory. Even when prominent legislators invite and endorse judicial

intervention, the judiciary itself may resist and dispute the propriety of its involvement. For
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certify" process for political question doctrine itself? Is the legislative
invitation merely a factor in deciding whether an issue qualifies as a political question, or did the Insular Cases create an outright exception to
political question doctrine in an act of common law constitutionalism?
More broadly, what are the outer limits of the consent and certify
process? Are there political subjects of such an exquisitely legislative
nature that judicial mediation of the dispute cannot be defended no matter how supportive the political branches are?2 Does the absence of legislative consent mean that judicial intervention may be sapped of its legitimacy in cases where the political branches object to the courts' involvement? To what extent does popular support for judicial resolution
of difficult, politically charged questions answer-or at least allay-the
concerns of those who accuse the modern Supreme Court of being overly
activist? For example, could the consent and certify theory explain and
justify the Court's intervention in Bush v Gore?262 Gay marriage? The
rights of terrorist detainees?
Ultimately, these unresolved issues arise from an effort to reimagine the sources of judicial legitimacy, particularly where the Court is
invited to tackle vexing political controversies. In a nation where the
democratic branches often seek the counsel of the Supreme Court, the
enduring validity of the Court's decisions in these cases may be determined in part by precursive political affirmation of judicial action.

example, just before the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, Senator Arlen Specter, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated in an amicus brief to the Court:
"While Congress will undoubtedly continue to work its will, it is incumbent upon this Court to
provide appropriate constitutional guidance and to restore habeas to its rightful place." Specter
Brief at *27 (cited in note 245). See also Arlen Specter, The Chamber of Secrets: The High Court
Should Accept More Cases-and Open Itself to Television Cameras,Natl L J (Aug 3,2009), online

at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202432681137 (visited Feb 24,2010).
Specter's solicitation prompted a stern rebuke from a distinguished member of the judiciary.
Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, commented:
Still others, such as Senator Arlen Specter, claim that the Supreme Court ought to be deciding more hot-button cases touching on major political issues of the day. But sniffing out political questions is not the Court's job. Its mandate is limited to resolving "cases and controversies." In fact, the more dry and technical the controversy, the more the Supreme Court
may appear to be acting like a court of law. Conversely, an overload of hot-button issues
might diminish the public's confidence that the Court is truly upholding the rule of law.
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, If It Ain't Broke ... , 119 Yale L J Online 67 (2009), online at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/07/wilkinson.htmi (visited Feb 11, 2010).
261 Consider generally Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989).
262 531 US 98 (2000).
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